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FOREWORD 
EEC-USA  Relations  are  developing at  such  a  pace  that 
a  Committee  Opinion  can  do  no  more  than outline  the  situation. 
This  brochure  contains  the  Own-initiative  Opinion 
adopted  by  the  Committee  in July  1983,  the  accompanying  Report 
by  Mr  STARATZKE  (Germany,  Employers)  and  the  original 
Information Report  drafted by  Mr  EVAIN  (France,  Employers)  for 
the  Section  for External  Relations. 
The  brochur~  includes  also  excerpts  from  the  debate 
on  EEC-USA  relations held during  the  Plenary Session of 7  July 
1983. 
The  statements  reflect  the  personal  views  of  those 
who  participated  in  the  debate  but  they  are  of  course 
indicative of the views  of the  representatives of economic  and 
social  interests  which,  in  view  of  the  close  economic  ties 
between  these  two  major  blocs,  merit  close  consideration  at 
all  stages of EEC-USA  relations. 
Franc;ois  CEYRAC 
Chairman 
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A.  OPINION  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE  ON  RELATIONS 
BETWEEN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
This  Opinion  on  Relations  between  the  European 
Community  and  the  United  States,  is  a  resume  and  contains 
findings  of  the  Information  Report  and  the  Report  referred to 
in  the  preamble.  The  three  documents  are  complementary,  and 
should  be  considered  as  a  whole, 
In  many 
Community  and  the 
respects  relations 
United  States  are 
between  the  European 
based  on  deep--seated 
solidarity  both  political  and  economic.  Cooperation  is 
essential  in  view  of  the  interdependence  of  the  two  partners' 
economies  and  efforts  are  required  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic. 
The  Committee  observes  that  the  main  causes  of 
disagreement  lie  either  in  (a)  differing  policies,  resulting 
from  differing interests or  (b)  conflicting interpretations of 
the  facts  often  generating misunderstandings. 
The  occasional  disputes  between  the  two  partners 
should  therefore  be  seen  in perspective,  though  this does  not 
mean  that  they  should be  played  down. 
Bilateral  issues 
Ever  since  the  inception of  the  Community  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  has  frequently  been  - and  will 
probably continue  to  be  - a  source  of polemics  between  the  USA 
and  Europe.  Currently it is a  major  bone  Ol  contention. - 2  -
The  USA  is loath  to  accept  the  existence  of  the  CAP 
and  the  rapid  increase  in  agricultural  production  in  the 
Community.  American  agricultural  products  come  up  against 
competition  from  Community  exports  on  the  world  markets.  The 
harder  dollar  has  also  made  American  exports  more  expensive. 
Faced with this predicament,  the  USA  has  submitted  an  official 
complaint  to  the  GATT  about  the  Community  and  the  CAP, 
accusing  the  Community  of  seizing  an  unfair proportion  of the 
world market.  It is worth  noting,  however,  that  US  exports to 
non-Community  countries  have  risen  more  sharply  in  recent 
years  than  Community  exports  to  thAse  markets. 
As  the world's major agricultural  exporters,  the  USA 
and  the  Community  should  work  together  for  the  smooth 
development  of  international  trade  in  agricultural  products, 
which  could  be  given  concrete  form  in  international  commodity 
agreements.  Such  agreements  should  also  improve  the  position 
of  developing  countries.  The  GATT  Committee  on  Agricultural 
Products  could  be  a  vehicle  for discussions. 
After arduous  negotiations,  the  Community  agreed  to 
voluntary  restraint  on  steel  exports  to  the  USA  till  the  end 
of 1985.  The  Community  accepted  this as  a  "lesser evil".  It 
should  now  demonstrate  determination  and  unity  in  this 
question,  and  make  sure  this  arrangement  is  respected.  It 
should  already  be  giving  thought  to  the  type  of  relations  it 
would  like  to  see  established in this sector,  especially after 
the  US  authorities'  recent  decisions  restricting  imports  of 
special  steels,  which  are  greatly  to  be  deplored. 
As  the  Community's  advanced  technology  sector  is 
lagging  behind  that  of  the  USA  (and  Japan),  it is  vital  to 
embark  on  an  industrial  policy  also  based  on  closer - 3  -
cooperation  between  Community-based  firms.  Any  tension  which 
this  pol icy  may  generate  with  the  United  States  could  be 
alleviated  if,  as  the  Committee  suggests,  the  Community 
pursued  a  policy of cooperation  (on  an  equal  footing)  with  the 
USA,  particularly  in  the  field of  research  and  development. 
Other  sectors  where  conflicts  periodically  arise 
include  cars,  petrochemicals  and  synthetic  fibres,  textiles 
and  clothing,  footwear,  services  and  sea  and  air  transport. 
The  Committee  feels  that  the  two  partners  should  seek  to 
resolve  disputes  by  holding  joint  disrussions  on  a  case-by-
case  basis.  It is clear from  previous  instances  that  agreement 
is possible,  given  goodwill. 
Multilateral  issues 
The  Committee  notes  that  Congress,  the 
Administration  and  the  courts  of  law  have  given  American  laws, 
regulations  and  jurisprudence  precedence  over  some  of  the 
United  States'  international  obligations.  Interpretation  of 
the  GATT  rules  drawn  up  at  the  outcome  of  the  Tokyo  Round  are 
a  case  in  point.  For  example,  the  Americans  interpret  the 
concept  of  "injury",  in  connection  with  anti-dumping  and 
anti-subsidies  measures, 
partners. 
differently  from  their  main  trade 
The  Committee  would  recommend  that  the  Commission 
continue  to  press  the  United  States  to  fall  in  line  with 
commonly-accepted  international  practice. 
The  Committee  is concerned  by  calls  in  Congress  for 
bilateral  reciprocity  with  a  number  of  the  United  States' - 4  -
trade  partners.  This  could  disrupt  the  international  trade 
system. 
The  Committee  would  urge  the  Commission  to  study  in 
detail  the  documents  currently  before  Congress, 
fully  aware  of their implications. 
so  as  to  be 
The  United  States  seriously  underestimates  the 
importance  for  the  Community  of trade with Eastern Europe.  The 
American  embargo  imposed  on  Community  firms  in  the  case  of the 
SibGr,i.a.n  gas  pipeline  was  all  the  more  unacceptahle  as  tne 
Member  States were  not  consulted beforehand  and  as it amounted 
to  making  American  legislation  applicable  worldwide  and 
retroactively. 
The  forthcoming  renewal  in  September  1983  of  the 
1979  Export  Administration Act,  which  provided  the  legal  basis 
for  the  embargo,  is naturally giving  rise  to  serious concern 
among  Community  businessmen  and  politicians,  and  in  the  public 
at  large. 
The  Committee  endorses  the  endeavours  on  the  part of 
the  Community  and  Member  States  to  persuade  Congress  to  make 
the  EAA  more  sensitive  to  Europe's  interests. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Community  and  the  United 
States will  adopt  a  common  approach  to  Japan,  as bllaterally-
negotiated  voluntary  restraint  agreements  between  Tokyo  and 
one  of  the  partners will  inevitably affect  the  other partner. 
Views  on  development  cooperation differ sharply.  The 
USA  fails  to  appreciate  the  full  scale  of  development  problems 
and  should,  in  the  Committee's  view,  contribute  more - 5  -
energetically  to  the  success  of  the  North-South  dialogue.  Here 
the  Committee  regrets  the  disappointing  outcome  of  the  Sixth 
UN  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD). 
It  is  in  the  interests  not  just  of  the  USA  but  of 
the  entire  world  economy  that  the  fight  against  inflation  be 
continued.  Here  the  USA  has  given  preference  to  monetary 
pol icy  measures  (strict  control  of  the  money  supply,  high 
interest  rates)  rather  than  fiscal  policy  measures  (tax 
legislation,  spending cuts).  A  tight  monetary  policy,  coupled 
with  a  hefty budget  deficit,  has  in  the  past  few  years,  led  to 
an  excessive  rise  in  interEst  rates.  The  negative  consequences 
of this have  not  been  confined  to  the  United  States.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  high  interest  rates  have  discouraged 
investment  (and  continue  to  do  so),  besides  contributing  to 
soaring  unemployment,  in  the  United  States  and  the  Community 
alike. 
The  USA  obviously  underestimated  the  possible 
implications  of  their policies  for  the  economy  of  their  main 
trading partners. 
The  Committee  would  therefore  like  to  see  a  regular, 
intensive  dialogue  between  those  in  pos1tions  of 
responsibility  in  the  USA  and  the  Community  with  a  view  to 
achieving  fair  concessions on  both  sides. 
In  this connection,  the  Committee  appeals  to  the  USA 
and  the  Community  to  adopt  a  joint  stand  on  :  (a)  world 
economic  ree:overy;  (b)  determination  of  new  macro-economic 
priorities,  starting with  employment;  (c)  more  stable parities 
between  the  major  currencies  (dollar,  ECU,  Yen,  etc.)  .<1nd - 6  -
(d)  improvement  of  development  cooperation  (including  the 
question of  the  LDC's  debt  burden). 
Lastly,  the  Committee  regards  the  recent 
Williamsburg  Summit  as  a  disappointment  since  the  Community 
clearly  has  not  yet  succeeded  in  convincing  the  USA  of  the 
need  for  a  joint approach. 
Suggestions  for  improved  relations with  the  United States 
If it is to  play its full  role  in dealings  with  the 
USA,  the  Community  w.i.ll  have  to  rely  in  the  first  place  on 
itself.  It  therefore  has  to  promote  implementation  and 
consolidation  of  its  common  policies  especially  in  the 
industrial  sector.  These  are  the  prerequisites for pursuit of 
a  genuine  common  pol icy  on  trade  to  non-member  countries, 
which will  enable  the  Community  to  act  as  a  united bloc.  In 
this  connection,  the  Committee  would  refer  to its Opinion  on 
the  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  on  the 
Strengthening  of  the  Common  Commercial  Policy  with  Regard  in 
Particular to Protection Against  Unfair Practices(!). 
The  Committee  would  reiterate  *that  GATT  is  the 
keystone  of international  trade.  GATT  rules  can  only  be  fully 
effective  if  all  contracting  parties  accept  this.  The 
Community,  as  the  world's  largest  trading power,  and  the  USA 
have  a  responsibility  to  the  rest  of  the  world  in  the  fight 
against protectionist  temptations. 
The  Committee  cons:i.ders  that  a  bigger  two-way  flow 
of  investment  between  the  Community  and  the  USA  - with  the 
(1)  CES475/83 - 7  -
Community  giving  encouragement  to  US  interests  would  do  much 
to  increase  cooperation  and  mutual  understanding. 
The  Committee  is convinced  that greater stability in 
international  trade  and  finance  would  be  in  the  interests  of 
both  the  USA  and  the  Community.  New  strategies  to  this  end 
should  therefore  be  devised by  the  two  partners  and  would,  for 
instance,  help  to  restore  confidence  at  a  time  when  many 
countries are virtually bankrupt. 
For  all  these  reasons,  the  Committee  is  convinced 
that  the  Community  should  engage  in  a  permanent  dialogue with 
the  USA  and  that  this  dialogue  should  embrace  not  only 
politicians  and  civil  servants  but  also  economic  and  social 
interest  groups.  The  Committee  also  recommends  a  systematic 
two-way  flow  of  information  to  enhance  the  public's 
understanding  of  the  realities.  These  recommendations  are 
expanded  in  the  Report  of the  Section for External  Relations. 
The  Committee  would  conclude  by  stressing that  (a)  a 
united European  stand  bolsters  the  Member  States'  negotiating 
position  and  (b)  a  strong  Community  is  crucial  to 
international  peace  and  security.  It  hopes  that  the  USA  will 
revert  to  the  positive  attitude  to  European  integration 
displayed at  the  Community's  inception and  provide  the  support 
that was  forthcoming  in  those  days. 
* 
* - 8  -
B.  REPORT  OF  THE  SECTION  FOR  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
(Rapporteur  Mr  Hans-Werner  STARATZKE) 
The  Section  for  External  Relations  prepared  an 
Information  Report  in  1982  on  relations  between  the  European 
Community  and  the  United States  (see Part II).  This  report is 
still highly  topical.  However,  several  passages  have  to  be 
adapted  or amplified  to  take  account  of  recent  events. 
The  present  document  is built  on  the  conviction  that 
the  points  of agreement  between  the  two  partners  f~r outweigh 
their differences.  An  introductory  chapter  is devoted  to  the 
things  which  the  United  States and  the  European  Community  have 
in  common.  Three  chapters  take  a  look at  areas where  there  are 
differences  and  at  the  dossiers which  are  pending.  The  final 
chapter  contains  a  number  of  recommendations  for  overcoming 
existing  and  potential  sources of conflict. - 9  -
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  EEC 
are  of  a  highly  political  nature,  founded  upon  a  dual 
solidarity: 
-western  solidarity,  which  forms  th~  backdrop  to  these 
relations,  and  affects  the  security of Europe; 
- solidarity  arising  from  common  interests  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic: 
.  a  high  and  comparable  level  of social  progress; 
a  social  market  economy  based,  as  a  general  rule,  on  free 
enterprise  and  open  international  trade; 
intensive  trade,  due  to  the  size  of  the  two  partners' 
markets  and  a  certain complementarity of  the  economies; 
a  fundamental  commitment  to  democracy  and  respect  for 
human  rights  (the  fundamental  tenets of  the  EEC). 
Solidarity in  the  western world has  existed for more 
than  two  centuries  and  is a  guarantee  of  the  future  of the  two 
peoples. 
The  trade  problems  which  beset  EEC/US  relations must 
be  put  in perspective,  without  under-rating their importance. 
They  occur both  in American  and  European markets,  and  in  those 
of third countries.  They  concern major  industrial  sectors  and 
impinge  on  the  underlying  principles  of  Community  and  US 
farming  policies.  Although  most  trade  operates  in  accordance 
with  the  GATT  rules,  which  both  parties  have  endorsed,  in 
practice  the  US  still  disputes  certain  of  the  agreements 
reached  at previous multilateral negotiations. - 10  -
At  a  time  when  world  trade  is  threatened  by 
protectionism,  the  two  trade  partners  cannot  evade  the 
responsibility inherent  in  the  scale of their mutual  trade  and 
their  international  economic  standing.  The  attitude  of  the 
present  Congress gives  cause  for concern  in  the  light of this. 
The  United  States  and  the  Community  have  been  hit 
simultaneously  and  to  a  comparable  degree  by  the  economic 
recession.  It  would  be  greatly  in  their  interests  to  join 
forces  and  pull  themselves  out  of  the  slump. 
The  interdependence  of  their  economies  should 
encourage  both  sides  to  seek  the  kind of collaboration that is 
to  be  expected  between partners. 
II.  DISPUTES  AND  DISAGREEMENTS  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  PARTNERS 
Some  disputes  have  been  sparked  off  by  differing 
policy  approaches,  others  by  conflicts  of  interest  in  one 
sector or another  (see  Chapter III). 
The  United  States  can  draw  on  a  vast  and  constantly 
up-dated  panoply  of  legal  and  other provisions for  the  purpose 
of  taking effective action  to  stem  the  tide of certain imports 
and  mitigate  the  effects of others.  The  Information Report  on 
relations between  the  European  Community  and  the  United States 
outlines  the  most  significant of these  provisions. 
In  contrast,  the  Community  still  lacks  a 
sufficiently effective  common  trade  policy.  This  is mainly  due 
to  the  effect  of  industrial  economic  and  moneta:cy  policies 
(which  are,  by  and  large,  controlled by  the  Member  States)  on 
trade.  Nonetheless,  Community  policy  makers  are  showing  a 
growing  awareness  of  the  need  for  a  united  front  to  US  demands 
and  certain  US  barriers.  With  this  in mind,  the  Section  for 
External  Relations  is  anxious  that  Community  machinery  be  set 
up  to  safeguard  and  promote  the  Member  States'  trade 
interests. - 11  -
The  United  States  has  an  advantage  over  the 
Community  in  that  its  institutional  system  makes  decision-
taking  more  rapid  and  effective  decisions  are  sometimes 
taken  in  response  to  pressure  from  specific  interest  groups  -
even  if  this  does  not  always  lead  to  a  consistent  trade 
policy.  The  Community  often has  to  try  and  strike  a  delicate 
balance  between  Member  States whose  national  interests have  to 
be  weighed  up  before  a  common  stand  can  be  achieved.  Thus,  it 
cannot  always  play  a  role  comnensur-ate  with  its  economic  and 
commercial  strength. 
Despite  large-scale  trade,  frequent  contacts  and 
real  common  interests,  pol icy  makers  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  sometimes  take  a  different  attituGe  to  certain 
issues.  A  tendency  to  underestimate  the  others'  problems while 
over-dramatizing  their  own  seems  to  be  prevalent  on  both 
sides. 
All  in  all,  trade  relations  with  the  United  States 
are difficult  for  the  Community.  Many  sectors of the  European 
economy  are  under  constant  threat.  The  Section would  therefore 
recomend  that  the  various  Community  bodies  remain alert  to  any 
possible  developments. 
III.  BILATERAL  ISSUES 
Agriculture 
Despite  its  substantial  surplus  on  its  food  trade 
with  the  Community,  for  many  years  the  United  States has  been 
critical of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP),  which  came 
under  attack  at  every  single  round  of  GATT  talks.  On  each 
occasion,  a  comparatively  peaceful  solution  was  reached  only 
by  virtue  of  concessions  on  the  part  of  the  Community  ( 1) 
Initially,  the  US  Administration  strove  to  ensure  that  its 
agricultural  products  had  continued  access  to  the  markets  of 
(1)  E.g.:  fats,  oils and  soya  bound  at  zero  duty. - 12  -
the  Community  which,  in  principle,  increasingly  favours  its 
own  farmers.  The  refunds  paid  on  exports  of  Community  food 
surpluses  to  non-Community  countries  are  the  most  recent 
source  of  attacks,  on  the  grounds  that  these  refunds  have 
allowed  the  Community  to  seize  an  unfair  share  of  the  world 
market.  This  argument  would  not  seem  to  be  borne  out  by 
statistics  since  US  sales  to  non-Community  countries  have 
outpaced  Community  exports to  these  countries  in recent years. 
US  exports  have  also  become  more  expensive  because 
of  the  relative  rise  in  the  value  of  the  dollar.  Naturally 
this  is  a  source  of  anxiety  to  the  United  States  which  like 
any  other industrial country,  has  its farming  and  farm  incomes 
problems.  Statistics  show  that  although  in  aggregate  the 
Community  spends  more  than  the  United  States  on  its 
agriculture,  it  spends  less  per  capita  of  the  farm  labour 
force. 
The  United States'  coordinated  infrastructure,  level 
of  modernization  and  crop  rotation  system  give  it  the  edge 
over  the  Community's  variegated  agriculture ( 1).  The  American 
agricultural  system  is  also  heavily  geared  towards  products 
for  export  (cereals,  soya).  The  foundations  of  the  CAP  are  not 
negotiable  with  non-EEC  countries  because  the  CAP  offers 
income  guarantees  to  a  substantial  part of the  EEC  population. 
This  was  borne  out  by  the  united  stand  adopted  by  the  Ten 
during  the  GATT  talks  held  in  Geneva  at  the  end  of  November, 
when  the  United States tried yet  again  to  challenge  the  CAP. 
The  United  States  is,  in  fact,  concerned  that  the 
Community  might  introduce  a  levy  on  vegetable  oils  (which  are 
zero-rated  under  GATT)  in  order  to  safeguard  the  interests of 
EEC  butter and  olive oil producers. 
(1)  This  is particularly true  of  cereals,  whether  for  bread-
making  or for  animal  feed. - 13  -
Community  refunds  on  beef  and  veal  have  stabilized 
world  prices  to  a  certain extent.  As  the  United States  is an 
importer of  beef it is not  in competition  with  the  Community, 
and  therefore  indirectly benefits  from  these  EEC  measures. 
EEC/US  relations  are  more  complex  where  sugar  is 
concerned.  There  has  been  a  dispute  in  this  sector  for  a 
number  of  years.  In  1981,  the  Community  issued  a  new 
Regulation making  European producers  responsible  for financing 
exports.  The  United  States  retaliated  in  1982  by  re-
introducing  import  quotas,  which effectively barred Community 
imports.  The  matter has  been  referred to  GATT. 
The  US  has  recently  started  to  over-produce  dairy 
products which  are  now  in competition with  European  produce  on 
third markets.  Nevertheless,  its interests coincide with  those 
of  the  EEC:  either exports  should cost  the  taxpayer  less,  or 
output  should be  cut. 
US  cereal  exports  are  five  times  those  of  the 
Community  and  are  cheaper,  in  real  terms,  to  produce.  There  is 
now  a  major  US  plan  to  re,juce  cereal  acreage  (under  certain 
conditions,  farmers  will  be  given  so  many  bushels  per 
unplanted acre).  This  has  been  successful  up  to  a  point.  The 
Commission  aims  to cut  back  cereal  production  in  the  Community 
by  reducing  real  prices. 
Although  American  farmers  (like  their  European 
counterparts)  benefit  from  federal  and  state  incentives, 
agricultural  revenue  has  plummeted  in  the past  ten years. 
In  conclusion,  it is in the  interests of  the  United 
States  and  the  Community,  as  the  world's  main  agricultural 
exporters,  to  seek  to  establish  more  peaceful  conditions  fo.r 
international  trade.  This  could  be  done  by  concluding 
international  agreements for  individual  products. - 14  -
US/EEC  cooperation  would  naturally  be  of  world-wide 
benefit.  It should assist developing countries.  Discussions  to 
this  end  could  be  held  under  the  GATT  Committee  on 
agricultural  products. 
Steel 
The  world steel sector is a  sensitive  one,  owing  on 
the  one  hand  to  the  drop  in  demand,  anc  on  the  other  to  the 
emergence  of  new  producer countries.  The  difficulties in EEC-
USA  trad:i ng  relation~,  which  are  only  one  aspect  .,:.f  this  bad 
overall  situation,  are  also  due  to  the  United  States' 
sluggishness  in  adapting,  and  making  adequate  investments,  in 
recent  years.  There  have  often  been  clashes  between  the  two 
partners.  The  plethora of anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy suits 
brought  by  US  producers  against  Community  imports  led  to  a 
temporary  "truce"  in October  1982.  The  Community  undertook  to 
restrict  its  exports  of  ten  categories  of  goods  to  the 
United  States up  to  31  December  1985;  in return,  US  producers 
agreed  not  to  bring  any  further  suits  concerning  these 
products  during  the  intervening period. 
It is worth  noting  that: 
- the  Community  considers  the  above  suits  to  be  incompatible 
with  the  GATT  Code  of  Conduct  signed  at  the  close  of  the 
Tokyo  Round;  this  is particularly  true  of  the  US  definition 
of  "damage".  Similarly,  there  is disagreement  on  the  meaning 
of  the  term  "subsidy". 
- the  Community  steel  industry  too  is in  a  grave  crisis. 
The  voluntary  restraint  solution  accepted  by  the 
Community  may  have  been  the  "least 
circumstances.  The  European  steel 
accepted  "voluntary"  restrictions 
penetrating  the  barrier  put  up  by 
bad"  compromise  in  the 
industry  has  reluctantly 
as  the  only  means  of 
the  United  States  and - 15  -
maintaining  a  steady,  albeit  reduced,  flow  of European  steel 
exports  to  the  US.  In  future,  however,  the  Community  will  have 
to  display  firmness  and  unity  in  this  matter  since  US 
producers  make  no  secret  of  their  ambition  to  force  the 
Community  to  make  other  concessions  on  special  steel  exports 
to  the  United  States.  The  Commission  is  therefore  holding  a 
series  of  preliminary  talks  with  the  United  States 
authorities. 
Cars 
Agreements  be-t:.ween  American  manufacturers  c:.>nd  the 
Japanese  could  indirectly  disadvantage  Europe&l  manufacturers 
on  their own  and  other markets (1) 
There  is a  likelihood of more  intense  competition  in 
the  future  from  medium-sized  American  cars  designed  for 
European  tastes.  Recent  years  have  seen  heavy  investment  by 
American  investors  in this sector in  the  United States,  Europe 
and  the  rest of the world. 
On  15  December  1982  the  House  of  Representatives 
adopted  a  bill  requiring  that  foreign  cars sold  in  the  United 
States  should  incorporate  a  minimum  percentage  of  American 
components.  This particular Bill  lapsed because  a  new  Congress 
was  elected;  another,  identical,  draft  was  however  tabled on 
2  February  1983.  These  provisions,  scheduled  to  take  effect  in 
1984,  would  set  a  3.3%  minimum  limit  per  consignment  of 
100,000 cars,  rising  to  10%  per 100,000 cars  in  1986,  with  a 
fixed  ceiling  of  90%.  If they  became  law,  these  provisions 
would  contravene Articles III and  XI  of  the  GATT. 
Vigilance  is  needed,  however,  since  although 
protectionism  may  so  far  be  little  more  than  a  speck  on  the 
(1)  On  this  point  see  the  Committee's  Opinion  on  Economic  and 
Commercial  Relations  between  the  European  Community  and 
Japan  (OJ  No.  C  230 of 10  September  1981) - 16  -
horizon,  it could  become  a  real  danger if other sectors of the 
us  economy  were  too  severely  hit  by  foreign  competition. 
Should  this  occur,  it  would  be  difficult  to  prevent 
protectionist  measures  being  taken  in  the  EEC  and  elsewhere, 
which  would  inevitably disrupt  the  world  economy. 
Advanced  technology 
Progress  ir.  advanced  technology  (particularly 
sectors  such  as  microelectronics,  data  processing, 
telecommur,ications,  fibre  optics  aud  biotechnological  methc~s) 
has  been  more  rapid  in  the  United  States  (and  Japan)  than  in 
aid programmes,  either direct  the  EEC.  This  is partly  due  to 
(American  military  programmes) 
Although  the  United  States  no 
or  indirect  (MITI  in  Japan). 
longer  lead  in  all  fields  of 
advanced  technology,  they  are  determined  at  all  costs  to 
retain their hegemony  in certain fields  (e.g.  aeronautics). 
Disputes  might  be  engendered 
determination  to  develop  these  activities 
by  European 
independently. 
Already,  customs  duties  are  often  higher  in  the  EEC  than  in 
the  United  States  and  Japan  (for  example,  17%  as  opposed  to 
4.2%  for  semi-conductors).  The  Community's  industrial  policy, 
like  that  of  the  individual  Member  States,  aims  to  promote 
growth  in  advanced  technology  sectors  - if necessary  by  means 
of incentives. 
The  Section  urges  that  efforts  to  achieve  this  aim 
be  stepped  up,  even  if it  exacerbates  tension  between  the 
United  States  and  Europe.  Nevertheless  the  Section  would 
appeal  to  the  two  partners  to  join  forces  in  Research  and 
Development  - but  on  an  equal  footing! 
Petrochemicals  and  synthetic  fibres 
The  United States continues  to  have  a  two-tier price 
system for  natural  gas,  which  favours  petrochemicals  and  the - 17  -
production of  chemical  fibres  using  gas-based  ethylene.  This 
results  in  serious  distortions  of  competition  for  Community 
producers(l) 
Although  energy  prices are  in  the  process of falling 
at  the  moment,  the  problem still exists,  ma.y be exacerbated by  a 
further fall  in the  dollar. 
The  situation  was  even  more  alarming  prior  to 
January  1981  because  regulated  prices,  which  were  low.:!r  than 
international market  prices,  applied  to  domestically-produced 
crude  oil  in addition  to natural  gas. 
The  two-tier  price  system  (practised  in  various 
other  countries  which  produce  raw  materials)  is  a  way  of 
subsidizing  domestic  industries  and  as  such  contravenes  the 
GATT  regulations  by  discriminating  against  foreign 
competition. 
The  EEC  Commission,  which  has  in  the  past  had  talks 
with  the  American Administration  on  the  "de-regulation"  of  the 
price  of  oil,  should  be  vigilant  in  this  case,  as  it also 
involves  important principles. 
American  exports  of  petrochemicals  and  synthetic 
fibres  are  known  forms  of  dumping  which  the  Community  has 
countered  in  accordance  with  the  GATT  regulations,  by  anti-
dumping  and  anti-subsidy  measures  with  particular  regard  to 
the  following  products: 
( 1)  See  the  Information  Report  compiled  by  the  Section  for 
External  Relations  on  EEC  - US  Relations  (See  Appendix). - 18  -
- textured polyester yarns 
- non-textured polyester yarns 
- textured polyester yarn fabrics 
- polyacrylic textile fibres  and continuous  filament  tow. 
Textiles  and  clothing 
As  the world  arrangement  on  textiles  (MFA)  is not  an 
instrument  of  trade  policy,  the  Community  cannot  employ 
counter  dumping  and  st::bsidized  imports  from  indust;rj_alized 
countries.  The  Community  must  therefore  use  its  own  anti-
dumping  and  anti-subsidy  laws. 
As  regards  the  continuing  discrepancy  between  the 
external  tariffs  of the  USA  and  the  Community  in  the  textiles 
and  c lathing  sector,  the  Community  should  make  use  of  every 
opportunity  to  urge  the  USA  to  lower  its  tariffs.  Although 
Greece,  on  its accession,  adopted  the  lower  Community  external 
tariff U),  this  unfortunately  did  not  lead  to  concessions  by 
the  USA  (and Japan).  The  USA  {and  Japan)  were  not  prepared  to 
grant  tariff  reductions,  so  that  in  the  end  the  Comm•.mi ty 
retaliated by  binding  several  of its own  tariff rates in  GATT 
at  a  higher  level.  The  Community,  must,  however,  uphold  its 
rights  in  view  of  the  forthcoming  accession  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  where  the  volume  of  goods  involved will  certainly be 
1 arger,  and  demand  tariff  reductions  from  the  USA  in  the 
textiles  and  clothing  sector.  Failing  this,  the  Community 
should  provide  for  compensatory measures. 
Shoes 
In  July  1981,  the  United  States  scrapped  the  OMAs 
(voluntary  restraint)  which  had  been  applied  to  imports  from 
Taiwan  and  South  Korea.  That  means  that  American  industry 
U)  With  respect  to  a  number  of textiles,  United States tariff 
protection is far higher  than  that  in  the  Community. - 19  -
cannot  ask  the  ITC  (International  Trade  Commission)  to  take 
new  measures  before  July  1983. 
In  1982,  the  strengthening  of the  dollar led  to  an 
upsurge  in  imports  (+28%).  European  exports  admittedly 
increased  by  15%,  but  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  were  the  major 
export beneficiaries  (+106%  and  +54%  respectively). 
American  industry reacted in  two  ways 
by  seeking  to increase administrative barriers to  imports; 
- by  lodging  a  complaint  under  Section  301  of  the  Trade  Act 
primarily against Taiwan,  South  Korea,  Japan  and Brazil,  but 
also against  the  European  Community  and  three  of its Member 
States in particular (Italy,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom). 
The  Administration  rejected  the  complaint  against  the 
Community,  whilst  proceeding  with  its  investigations  into 
the  accusations  of deflection  of  trade  levelled  by  American 
industry. 
As  a  result,  the  Community  faces  the  double  risk of 
a  cut  in  its  exports  to  the  United  States and of an influx  of 
Taiwanese  and  S.  Korean  imports  originally  destined  for  the 
United States. 
Services 
The  United  States  has  sought  the  liberalization  of 
international  trade  in  services  and  international  investments 
under  the  GATT.  The  GATT  Ministerial  Conference  of  November 
1982  decided  to  continue its  research  into  this matter with  a 
view  to  reaching  a  decision in 1984. 
The  Community's  economic  and  social  interest  groups 
are  in  favour  of  gradual  liberalization  in principle,  if all 
parties,  including  the  LDCs,  subscribe  to  it.  Steps  should - 20  -
anyway  be  taken  to  ensure  that  various  US  states  and  regional 
authorities  under  the  federal  administration  are  bound  by  the 
GATT.  At  present,  the  federal  states,  as signatories to  the 
GATT,  are  formally  bound  to  their  Level  (Level  II)  only, 
i.e.  they  have  undertaken  to  respect  the  code  to  the  best  of 
their ability. 
As  far  as  shipping  is·  concerned,  it  should  be 
remembered  that  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  a  Code  of 
Conduct  :for  Liner  Conferences  ent,Ers  into  force  in  October 
1983.  '·It  is  important  that  as  many  countries  as  possible 
adhere  to  this international  legal  regime. 
Yet  it appears  that  the  USA  continues  to  regard  the 
UN  Code  as  a  protectionist  regime  which  justifies,  on  its 
side,  followlng  a  protectionist  path  and  entering  into 
bilateral  cargo~sharing arrangements  with  any  country  willing 
to participate. 
Talks  between  the  USA  and  other  OECD  countries, 
including  EEC  countries,  are  continuing;  it is honed  that  an 
understanding  with  the  USA  can  be  reached  to  the  effect  that 
there  should  be  no  discrimination  as  between  the  parties' 
shipping  lines  in each  other's trades. 
Investments 
Although  American  investment  in  the  Community,  and 
in  the  rest  of  the  world,  has  decreased  in  response  to  the 
international  economic  recession,  the  Section  feels  that 
investment  is still a  vital  aspect  of  United  States/Community 
relations.  The  current  trading  problems  between  the  two 
partners  should  not  be  allowed  to  inhibit  bilateral 
investments. 
As  is  the  case  with  trade  problems, 
misunderstandings  or  lack  of  information  tend  to  discourage ----·-·  -·-·- ··-·--··- ---··----·  - -- ·-·-------------------
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the  United-States  from  embarking  on  fresh  investments  in  the 
Community.  Community  policies  likely  to  have  a  bearing  on 
investment  should  be  drafted  so  as  to  bring  home  the  reality 
of  the  situation to potential  investors. 
American  investment  has  already  contributed  to  the 
development  of  certain  Community  regions,  and  a  favourable 
climate  should be  created to  encourage  this pattern. 
IV.  MULTILATERAL  ISSUES 
Trade  reciprocity 
In  the  GATT  ministeral  declaration  (see  above)  the 
United  States  was  among  those  who  reiterated  the  need  to 
maintain  free  trading  relations  on  a  multilateral  basis.  But 
the  trend  towards  reciprocity  continues  to  surface  in 
Congress,  which  is  the  highest  authority  in  foreign  trade 
matters  in  the  United  States.  The  United  States  seeks  to 
obtain  greater  reciprocity 
bilateral  basis,  in  the 
from  its  trading  partners  on  a 
light  of  a  country-by-country 
examination  of  obstacles  to  exports  and  American  overseas 
investments. 
The  Section  urges  the  Commission  to  scrutinize  the 
documents  currently before  Congress with particular care,  and 
to  draw  the  appropriate  conclusions. 
Domestic  International  Sales Corporations  (DISC) 
Since  1972,  American  law  has  provided  tax relief (in 
particular  exemption  from  company  tax)  for  profits  made  on 
exports  from  the  United  States.  The  relevant  law  is  known  as 
"DISC"  (Domestic  International  Sales Corporations}. 
subsidy, 
The  Commission  believes  this  to be  a  form  of export 
an  opinion  which  is  shared  by  Canada  and  other ···--·----------------------------------------------
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contracting parties  to  the  GATT.  In  a  GATT  report published in 
December  1981,  the  impact  of DISC  legislation was  found,  in 
some  instances,  to  be  incompatible  with  US  commitments  under 
Article  XVI-4  of  the  Agreement. 
submitted  complaints  under 
authorization  to  take  retaliatory 
constant  Community  pressure,  the 
In  1982,  the  Community 
the  GATT  and  requested 
measures.  As  a  result  of 
US  Government  has  drafted  a 
bill  which  replaces  the  DISC  arrangement  and  would  be 
consistent with  GATT  provisions. 
Unitary  taxation 
Finally,  a  number  of  US  states  tax  companies  on 
profits  made  outside  as  well  as  inside  the  USA.  This  amounts 
to  double  taxation,  and  is  inconsistent  both  with  the  OECD 
recommendations  on  this point  and  with current practice. 
Relations with Japan ( 1) 
For  strategic  reasons,  above  all,  the  US  is  in  a 
strong  position  vis-a-vis  Japan  and  has  much  greater  "pull" 
than  Europe.  Nevertheless,  both  the  US  and  the  EEC  are 
adopting  a  similar attitude  towards  Japan  in seeking bilateral 
solutions based  on  voluntary restraint.  The  piecemeal  approach 
to  the  issues  involved  and  the  palliatives  whicl:  have  been 
adopted  give  an  impression  of  inconsistency.  The  measures 
taken  to  date  should  be  looked  on  as  stop-gap  arrangements, 
pending  genuine  solutions. 
Trade,  financial  and  industrial  relations with  the  LDCs 
To  the  extent  that  one  can  talk  about  a  definite 
policy as  such,  the  US  appears  to  be  changing its thinking on 
development  cooperation: 
( 1)  On  this  point  see  the Committee's  Opinion  on  Economic  and 
Commercial  Relations  between  the  European  Community  and 
Japan  (OJ  No.  C  230  of  10  September  1981). -- ·----------------------------
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- official  development  aid  is  giving  way  to  a  trade  approach 
("trade  not  aid") 
- there is a  shift towards bilateral relations with  the  LDCs, 
- an  attempt  is being  made  to  play  down  the  work  of  the  big 
international  organizations  such  as  the World  Bank  group; 
- a  distinction  is  now  made  between  the  stage  of  development 
reached  by  the  individual  LDCs. 
For  its  part,  the  Community  maintains  stable  and 
contractual  "multilateral"  relations  with  the  ACP  countries, 
which  it  is  seeking  to  expand.  It  makes  no  hard  and  fast 
distinction  between  rich  and  poor  LDCs.  It is  als~ conscious 
that  a  substantial  injection  of  funds  will  be  needed  for  many 
years  to  come  before  the  LDC  economies  develop  the  production 
capacity and  trade necessary  for  autonomy. 
East-West  trade 
Trade  with  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
(including  the  USSR)  is  clearly  more  important  (in  value 
terms)  for  the  Community  than  for  the  USA.  That  is  why  in 
pursuing  this  trade  the  Community  maintains  a  balance  between 
its political  and its economic  interests,  whereas  for  the  USA 
political considerations definitely predominate. 
Thus  in  the  case  of the  Siberian gas  pipeline,  the 
USA  adopted  measures  inspired  largely  if not  exclusively  by 
political considerations  and  deliberately disregarded European 
interests.  At  the  same  time,  moreover,  the  USA  lifted its 
embargo  on  grain supplies  to  the  USSR. 
The  USA  had  views  concerning  the  extraterritorial 
applicability  of  its  legislation  that  were  not  acceptable  to 
the  Community.  The  extremeness  of  the  USA  position  was - 24  -
highlighted all  the  more  clearly by  the  fact  that  the  embargo 
imposed  on  several  Member  States by  the  USA  was  retroactive  in 
certain respects  and  on  that score,  too,  was  unacceptable  to 
the  Community.  The  embargo  measures  were  lifted  in  November 
1982  subsequent  to  two  formal  complaints  (July  and  August 
1982)  by  the  Community  to  the  US  Government. 
The  impending  renewal,  in  September  1983,  of  the 
19?9  Export  Administrative  Act  (the  legal  basis  for  applying 
the  embargo)  is  thus  causing  deep  concern  on  political, 
economic  and  social circles in  the  Community.  It involves  two 
major  issues: 
- the  extra-territorial application of US  legislation,  and 
- the  retroactive  application of  such  legislation. 
The  Community's  trade  relations  with  the  countries 
of Eastern  Europe  should  be  developed  within  the  framework  of 
the  common  commercial  policy. 
however,  be  more  homogeneous: 
These  trade  relations  could, 
- if  the  Community  were  to  give  more  detailed  thought  to 
certain  types  of  transaction  agricultural  exports, 
technology  transfers,  etc.; 
- if  each  East  European  country  were  to  accept  the 
Commission's  longstanding proposal  regrading  the negotiation 
of bilateral  agreements  (as  Roumania  has  done). 
As  regards  East-West  relations  in  general,  the 
Section  regrets  that  the  work  on  harmonization  and 
coordination  in  this sphere  is being  carried  ou~  in  too  large 
a  number  of  international  bodies  (for example,  OECD  for export 
credits,  COCOM  for  strategic  goods,  GATT  for  general  trade 
rules,  etc.). - 25  -
Monetary  matters 
There  is  something  of  a  dilemma  as  far  as  US 
economic  policy  is  concerned.  It is  in  the  interests  of  not 
only  the  USA  but  also  the  world  economy  that  the  fight  against 
inflation should  be  continued  in  the  USA.  However,  the  policy 
pursued by  the  Federal  Reserve,  based essentially on monetary 
policy  and,  in particular,  on  the  control  of  the  money  supply, 
led  to  the  drastic  increase  in  interest  rates.  The  adverse 
consequences  of this increase,  especially on  employmer.t,  have 
by  no  means  been  confined  to  the  USA,  The  measures  taken  by 
the  Federal  Reserve  have  destabilized  the  exchange  rates 
between  the  major  currencies  and  thereby  slowed  down  economic 
activity and  pushed  up  unemployment.  The  entire w0rld  economy 
has  been affected by  this. 
However, 
more  far-reaching. 
the  monetary  consequences  have  been  much 
The  dollar  is  still  indispensable  as  an 
international  trading  currency.  About  three-quarters  of  all 
international  bank  loans  are  in  dollars.  This  means  that  US 
economic  and  monetary  policy  has  a  responsibility  which 
extends  far  beyond  the  country's  frontiers.  This  is  made 
particularly clear  by  the  repercussions  on  the  debt  servicing 
of  all  countries  with  debts  in  dollars  and  the  ensuing 
consequences  for  the  international  finance  system. 
These  repercussions  are  drastic  in  the  case  of  the 
LDCs  but  t~e Community  has  not  emerged  unscathed.  A  more  fully 
developed  EMS,  enjoying  the wholehearted participation of all 
Member  States,  would  equip  the  Co~~unity  for  the 
counterbalancing  role it is at present unable  to play. 
The  strength  of  the  dollar  and  high  US  interest 
rates  have  also  affected  relations  between  the  Community  and 
the  USA  in  the  fields of monetary  and  economic  policy. - 26  -
Since  a  lot of  the  Community's  imports  are  paid  for 
in  dollars,  a  strong dollar  puts  a  burden  on  the  Community's 
balance  of  payments,  though  it also  makes  the  Community  more 
competitive  on  dollar markets.  On  the  other hand,  the  USA  has 
more  difficulty  in exporting  to  the  Community  when  the  dollar 
is strong. 
The  high  interest  rates  and  in  some  cases  large 
differences  in  interest rates  also  have  a  considerable  impact 
on  coffipetition  on  export  marketa.  In  1980  alone  roughly  5,500 
million  dollars  were  spent  on  interest  rate  subsidies  in  the 
OECD  countries.  The  negotiations  on  an  ex~ension of  the  OECD 
consensus  on  export  credit  rates  in  1981  and  1982  have  by  no 
means  deprived  countries  with  a  rate  above  the  newly  agreed 
minimum  rates  of  room  for  manoeuvre  regarding  interest  rate 
subsidies. 
In  its battle  against  inflation,  the  United States 
has  placed  greater  emphasis  on  monetary  policies,  such  as 
tight  control  of  money  supply  and  high  interest rates,  than  on 
fiscal  measures  (taxation).  The  initial results give  hopes  of 
economic  recovery. 
From  the  Community's  viewpoint,  while  it  is 
desirable  that  stability  of  the  dollar  should  continue  to  be 
recognized  as  a  priority aim,  efforts  to  achieve  this end  must 
lay greater  stress  on  a  more  stringent  fiscal  policy,  though 
not  at  the  expense  of  the  social  security system. 
Recovery 
The  Community  has  high  hopes  of  a  recovery  in  the  US 
economy  which  will  stimulate  the  economy,  boost  trade  and 
growth,  and  curb  unemployment  on  a  world  scale.  The  anti-
inflation  measures  taken  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe, 
though  with  differing  rates  of  success,  may  be  seen  as - 27  -
promising  signs. 
underpin  recovery. 
The  two  partners  should  act  together  to 
The  Section  would  therefore  like  to  see  a  regular, 
intensive  dialogue  on  economic  and  monetary  matters  between 
those  in  positions  of  responsibility  in  the  USA  and  the 
Community  with  a  view  to  achieving  fair  concessions  on  both 
sides. 
From  this angle,  the  recent Williamsburg  SL~mit was 
a  disappointment  as  the  Community  has  not  yet  succeeded  in 
convincing  the  USA  of this need. 
V.  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  PROMOTING  UNDERSTANDING  BETWEEN  THE 
COMMUNITY  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Understanding  is contingent  on  mutual  respect.  Such 
an  understanding  will  encourage  the  two  partners  to  hold 
talks,  rather  than  taking retaliatory measures,  whenever  their 
interests clash. 
Just  as  Europeans  know  little  about  life  on  the 
other side  of  the  Atlantic,  the  general  public  in  the  United 
States  does  not  have  much  idea.  of  what  European  unification 
really entails or of its partner's anxieties.  This  is serious 
as  misunderstandings  escalate  into disputes  that  are difficult 
for  the  authorities  to  defuse. 
Many  disputes  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Community  are  explained by  inadequate  briefing on  each other's 
problems  or  by  different  approaches  to  a  given  situation. 
Dialogue  between  the  EC  Commission  and  the  US  administration 
on policy matters  must  be  substantially stepped  up  if it is to 
be  effective.  Such  dialogue  should,  in  the  Section's view,  be 
backed  by  more  regular  informal  meetings  to  allow  the  trade 
groups  directly  concerned  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic 
(employers' ,  workers 
1  and  farmers 
1  organizations)  - which - 28  -
ultimately  have  to  bear  the  brunt  of the  economic  situation  -
to  compare  their viewpoints. 
The  Community  is  currently  engaged  in  talks  and 
negotations  with  the  United  States  at  different  levels  and 
within  a  variety  of  bodies.  Yet  in  practice  only  a  limited 
number  of  people  are  involved  on  each  side.  Public  interest 
must  also  be  engaged.  For  the  purpose  of  impressing  the 
Community's  views  on  US  public  opinion  (parliamentarians, 
economic  and  social  groups,  the  media,  students,  school 
children,  etc),  the  Section for External  Relations  invites  the 
Commission  to  explore  - with  the  help  of  media  experts  - the 
feasibility  of  an  effective  public  relations  campaign  in  the 
United  States.  To  make  a  durable  impact  this  campaign  would 
have  to  be  spread  over  several  years  and  comprise  a  wide  range 
of activities angled primarily at  leaders of opinion.  It would 
cost substantially less  than  the  present  lack  of  knowledge  and 
misunderstanding.  As  a  first  step,  the  Community  Press  and 
Information Office  in  the  United  States could  be  instructed to 
study  the  matter.  The  Community  should  also  launch  a  campaign 
to  inform  public  opinion  in  Europe  about  economic  and  social 
conditions  in  the  United  States. 
Any  disputes  should  be  talked  over  by  the  two  sides 
with  a  view  to  reaching  a  mutually  acceptable  consensus.  If 
these  talks  fail,  the  disputes  stwuld  be  laid  before  GATT 
insofar  as  they  relate  to  trade.  Despite  its  occasional 
imperfections,  GATT  has  a  key  role  to  play  as  an  international 
trade  organization.  Anything  which  might  lead  to  1 ts  being 
weakened  should  be  avoided,  for  international  economic 
relations would  be  plunged  into greater  disarray  if GATT  were 
to  be  in  jeopardy.  The  Section  regrets  that  the  GATT 
regulations  do  not  carry  the  same  weight  in  the  United  States 
as  they  do  in  Europe,  i.e.  they  do  not  take  precedence  over 
national  laws. - 29  -
Good  relations  are  so  important  for  both  the 
Community  and  the  United  States  that  the  two  partners  should 
have  no  hesitation  - where  there  is  fundamental  disagreement 
on  a  particular  policy  - in  amending  their policies  to  make 
allowance  for  the other's vital  interests. 
At  all  costs.,  it  is  vi tal  that  the  two  partners 
steer clear of  protectionism  when  disputes  occur.  As  far  as 
both  the  United  States  and  the  Community  are  concerned, 
protectionism is not  a  lasting way  of solving problems,  for it 
only  leads  to  retaliatory measures.  In  view  of their influence 
in  world  trade,  the  major  industrial  nations  have  a  special 
responsibility for safeguarding free  trade world-wide. 
The  Section  would  finally  stress  that  the  United 
States,  who  once  fSted  the  birth  of  the  Community,  should 
endeavour  to  acquire  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  true 
political  value  of  a  united  Europe.  A  strong  Europe  is  a 
virtual  ally  to  the  United  States  in  the  common  fight  for 
freedom  and  peace  throughout  th€  world. 
* 
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C.  RECORD  OF  THE  PROCEEDINGS 
In  response  to  oral  amendments  introduced  by 
Mr  BRIGANTT  (Italy,  Various  Interests),  Mr  KIRSCHEN  (Italy, 
Workers)  and  Mr  TIXIER  (France,  Workers),  it was  decided  that 
the  Committee  Opinion  should  refer  to  the  disappointing 
outcome  of  the  VIth  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  \UNCTAD)  and  to  rece:1t  American  restrictions  on 
imports  of  special  steel  and  the  implication  of  these 
developments  for  international  trade. 
In  the  ensuing  discussion,  many  members  expressed 
the  view  that  the  Committee  Opinion  could  have  been  more 
forceful.  Mr  VERCELLINO  (Italy,  Workers)  would  have  welcomed  a 
more  explicit  reference  to  certain  disputes  which  have  had  a 
significant  impact  on  economic  growth  in  the  Community. 
Mr  KAMIZOLAS  (Greece,  Various  Interests)  felt  that  US  policy 
on  interest  rates  should  have  been  condemned  in  stronger 
terms.  Mr  BRIGANTI  (Italy,  Workers)  said that  disputes  about 
trade  should  be  examined  all  the  more  carefully  because  they 
were  so  closely  tied  in  with  international  economic  and 
financial  problems.  Mr  SPACHOS  (Greece,  Employers)  noted  that 
representatives  of  American  economic  and  social  interest 
groups  did  not pull  their punches  when  their interests were  at 
stake.  Mr  CAVAZZUTI  (Italy,  Workers)  warned  that  if  the 
Community  continued  to  take  a  moderate  line,  it could  appear 
to  endorse  deplorable  American  policies.  Mr  TIXIER  (France, 
Workers)  added  that  the  Opinion  should  have  called  for  a 
tougher  Community  line  in negotiations,  given  the  scale of the 
problems  involved. 
Mr  DELLA  CROCE  (Italy,  Workers)  said  that  the 
disputes with  the  United  States would  never have  come  to  this 
pass  if  the  Community's  negotiating  position  had  not  been 
undermined  by  its  inability  to  present  a  united  front. 
Mr  ARENA  (Italy,  Employers)  agreed,  saying  that  the  fact  that - 31  -
economic  and  political  integration in  the  Ten  was  still in its 
infancy,  inevitably  put  Community  negotiators  at  a 
disadvantage.  Mr  DE  BIEVRE  (Belgium,  Employers)  asked  how  the 
Community  proposed  to  influence  American  budgetary  policy, 
given  the  plethora of  diverging  budgetary  policies within its 
own  frontiers. 
Members  considered  that  the  dispute  over  trade  in 
agricultural  products  should  have  been  discussed  in  greater 
depth.  Mr  JAKOBSEN  (Denmark,  Various Interests)  made  the  point 
that  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP),  which  had  initially 
been  endorsed  by  the  United  States  was  still  a  force  for 
stability in Europe.  Mr  YVF.RNF.AII  (France,  Various  Interests), 
however,  feared  that  the  United  States  were  currently 
employing  guerilla  techniques  in  an  attempt  to  push  the  CAP 
off course.  Mr  RAINERO  (Italy,  Various  Interests)  pointed out 
that  the  US  moves  came  at  a  time  when  there  were  grounds  for 
stabilizing international  food  markets  by  means  of a  series of 
product  agreements. 
Mr  MARGOT  (Belgium,  Various  Interests)  said  that 
American  foreign  policy  was  largely  dictated  by  domestic 
interests.  Representatives  of  the  American  Chambers  of 
Commerce  had  said  as  much  during  the  hearing  organized  by  the 
Section for External  Relations.  Mr  ROMOLI  (Italy,  Employers) 
added  that  however  much  the  American Administration  claimed  to 
champion  free  trade,  international  considerations  were 
relegated  to  second  place  by  the  protectionism which  was  rife 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.  Should  international 
agreements  no  longer  protect  production,  the  principle  of 
reciprocity  and  voluntary  restraint  agreements  on  exports, 
would  prevail  as  a  result of political pressure. 
There  had  also  been  a  number  of  significant changes 
in  the  structure  of  US  industry  :  20  million  new  jobs  (as 
against  2  million  in Europe)  had  been  created between  1970  and - 32  -
1980,  90%  of  them  in  the electronics,  information  technology 
and  services  sectors.  People  trying  to  protect  jobs  in 
traditional  sectors  such  as  the  motor  vehicle  and  steel 
industries  were  fighting  a  losing  battle.  This  was 
particularly  true  in  Europe,  where  the  campaign  against 
unemployment  tended  to  obscure  reality  and  even  threatened  to 
put  European  industry out of  the  running  in  the  development  of 
new  technologies.  Mr  SPACHOS  agreed  that  i. t  was  vi  tal  to 
'  respond  to  new  trade  openings. 
On  protectionism,  Mr  ZINKIN  (United  Kingdom, 
Employers)  said  that  the  Community  and  the  United  States were 
both paying  lip service  to  the  principle of  free  trade  whilst 
using  every  possible  excuse  to  postpone  it.  Mr  van  der  VEEN 
(Netherlands,  Various  Interests)  felt  that  protectionism  was 
becoming  increasingly  attractive  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic.  He  therefore  thought  that  discussions  should  be 
stepped  up  both  at political  level  and  between  economic  and 
social  interest 
suggestion. 
groups. 
Mr  EMO  CAPODILISTA 
There  was  a  consensus  on  this 
(Italy,  Various  Interests) 
referred  to  the  regular contacts  between  European  and American 
agricultural  organizations.  He  said that  the  talks were  useful 
in strengthening  the  Community's  position,  in providing better 
reciprocal  information  and  in  dispelling  misunderstandings; 
the  meetings  should  be  encouraged  in  every  way.  Mr  JAKOBSEN 
said  tha,t  meetings  between  European  and  American  socio-
professional  organizations  had  some  impact  on  political 
decision-making.  Mr  van  HENS  (Netherlands,  Workers)  thought 
that  such  meetings  were  especially  valuable  as  EEC-USA  trade 
disputes  were  generated  by  the  international  economic 
recession  for  which  the  rich  countries  were  responsible. 
Disputes  arose  between  governments  rather  than  between 
economic  and  social  interest groups. 
* 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  EEC 
are  of  a  highly  political  nature, 
solidarity 
founded  upon  a  dual 
- Atlantic  solidarity,  which  forms  the  backdrop  to  these 
relations,  and  affects  the  security of Europe; 
solidarity  arising  from  common  interests  :  on  both  sides of 
the  Atlantic  social  achievements  (living  standards  of 
workers,  the  responsibility of the  two  sides of  industry for 
wages  and  working conditions)  are  important  and  more  or less 
comparable.  They  derive  from  a  market  economy  based  on 
international  free  trade.  On  both  sides of the Atlantic  too, 
political  freedom  is regarded  as  a  fundamental  value. 
On  a  purely  commercial  level  the  EEC/US  dispute 
should  be  put  in  perspective.  Insofar  as  it  affects  major 
industrial  sectors  and  therefore  a  large  number  of  jobs,  the 
dispute  is undoubtedly  important  and  serious.  But  it concerns 
only  5%( 1) of  trade,  95%  of  which  is  effected  freely  on  a 
multilateral  and  contractual  basis  (the  GATT  agreement),  and 
raises  no  outstanding  difficulties.  These  facts  must  not  be 
obscured  by  the publicity given  to  the  present difficulties. 
(l)Out  of  a  total  of  41  thousand  million  dollars'  worth  of 
Community  exports  to  the  United  States,  only  2.5  thousand 
million  is in dispute. - 34  -
II.  OBJECTIVE  DATA 
Trade  patterns  in the major  sectors 
industry,  services  and  agriculture 
The  past  decade  has  seen  a  marked  increase  in trade 
between  the  Community  and  the  United  States  :  Community 
imports  from  the  United States  increased  in value  by  217%  from 
1960  to  1970,  and  by  359%  from  1970  to  1980;  in  the  same 
periods,  Community  ex;->orts  to  the  United States  increased by 
278%  and  285%.  The  trade  balance  has  been,  and  remains,  in the 
favour  0f  the  United  Stated,  beth  for  trade  as  a  whole  (more 
than  14  thousand million  dollars in  1981)  and  for  "difficult" 
sectors  such  as  agriculture  (6.8  thousand  million  dollars  in 
1981). 
The  Community's  trade  deficit  has  however  begun  to 
drop  following  the  increase  (approximately  40%  in  18  months) 
in  the  value  of  the  dollar against  Member  State currencies  and 
to  the  levelling  off of domestic  demand  within  the  Community. 
The  Community  deficit  was  24.8  thousand  million  dollars  in 
1980. 
Role  of  foreign  trade  in  the  economies  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Community 
Foreign  trade  has  traditionally  had  a  far  greater 
economic  role  in  the  Community  than  in  the  United States,  even 
if the  Community  is regarded  as  a  whole(l):  in  1980,  Community 
exports  accounted  for  23.7%  of  GDP  as  opposed  to  7.6%  in  the 
United States(2). 
(l)i.e.  excluding  intra-Community  trade. 
(2)The  figures  for  1981  are  not  yet  available  but  do  not  seem 
to differ greatly. - 35  -
In  a  number  of  Member  States,  foreign  trade 
(including  intra-Community  trade)  accounts  for  close  on  50%  of 
GDP. 
Foreign  trade  is  having  an 
economic  and  political  life  in America. 
increasing  impact  on 
In both  industry  and 
agriculture  the  proportion  of  production  exported  has  doubled 
over  the  last ten years.  Congress,  the  two  sides of industry, 
and  public  opinion,  are  paying  greater  attention  to  it. 
Protectionist  pressure  is  being  magnified  by  the  recession. 
The  Administration is seeking  to  contain  th:i.s  pressure.  but  is 
trying  to  pursue  a  strong  commercial  policy  which  will 
actively  support  the  expansion  of  American  enterpri.3eS 
overseas. 
American  industry  is  increasingly  exposed  to 
international  competition  on  its  home  market.  Whereas  in  the 
sixties most  major  American  industries held  ov~r 90%  of their 
home  market,  current  figures  show  a  marked  drop  in  most 
cases  :  40%  in  t~e mass-consumption  electronics sector,  66%  in 
the  shoes  sector,  74%  in  the  machine  tools  sector,  55%  in the 
textile equipment  sector,  75%  in  the  car sector,  and  so  on. 
America's  share  of  world  trade  has  dropped  to  10% 
from  the  30%  or  so  recorded after the  second  world war. 
The  industrial  capacity  utilization  rate  fell  from 
83.8%  in  1978  to  76%  in  1981.  The  figures  for  the  motor, 
chemical  and  metal-products  sectors  are  :  95.3%  to  63.3%, 
80.3%  to  75%,  and  84.5%  to  73.3%.  In  the  case  of  steel this 
figure  has  fallen  below  50%,  while  imports  achieved  a  22% 
share  of  the  market  in  the  first five  months  of  1982  compared 
with  16%  in  the  same  period  in 1981. 
On  the  other hand,  US  exports  are  expanding  rapidly 
in sectors  such  as  services  and  advanced  technology. - 36  -
American  exports  of  services  currently  exceed 
60  thousand  million  dollars.  This  generated  a  surplus  of 
3.5  thousand  million  in  1980  in  trade  with  the  EE-c alone Q:), 
while  this  year  for  the  first  time  American  statistics  show 
that  the  number  of  jobs  in  the  services  sector  (excluding 
commerce,  transport  and  public  administration)  exceeds  that in 
industry  (including construction). 
The  American  trade  surplus  in  the  advanced 
technology  sector  has  overtaken  the  surplus  traditionally 
recorded  in  the  farm-produce  sector  (39  thousand  million 
dollars  in  1980  as  opposed  to  23.8  in  1980  and  26.5  in  1981  in 
the  case  of  farm  produce)(2), 
These  figures  give  a  clearer picture  of  the  two-fold 
nature  of  current  American  trade  policy,  which  is 
protectionist on  some  issues,  and  vehemently  in  favour  of free 
trade  on  others. 
Investment  flows  United  States/EEC  and  EEC/United States 
Net  American  investment  (direct  investment)  in  the 
EEC  totalled  20.3  thousand  million  dollars  in  1970,  and 
76.6  thousand  million  in  1980.  The  United  Kingdom  is  the  EEC 
country  in  which  America  has  invested  most  heavily 
($  28  thousand million).  Next  in order of  importance  come  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  followed  by  France,  the 
Netherlands, 
Denmark ( 3) . 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Ireland  and 
(1)This  figure  fell  back  to  0.1  in  1981. 
(2)Figures  quoted 
administration. 
remains  vague. 
by  a 
But  the 
(3)See  table  4  appended. 
representative  of  the  American 
concept  of  "advanced  technology" - 37  -
Overseas  investment  income  contributes  some  $  30 
thousand  million  annually  to  the  US  balance  of  payments.  In 
addition,  one  third  of  American  exports  go  to  the  overseas 
subsidiaries of American  companies(!). 
Net  European  investment  (direct  investment)  in  the 
United  States  has habitually  been  of  a  much  lower  order.  For 
the  last  ten  years,  however,  it  has  been  expanding  more 
rapidly  than  American  investment  in  the  EEC~):  it was$ 7.4 
thousand  million  in  1970  and$ 37.9  thousand  million  in  1980. 
The  weakness  of  the  dollar  in  the  second  half  of  the  decade 
was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  reasons  for  this  trend.  The 
Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdum  are  the  rrain  source  of 
European  investment  in  the  United  States  ( $  16.2  thousand 
million and$  11.4  thousand million  respectively in 1980). 
The  very  high  level  of  American  investment  in  the 
EEC  during  the  60's  and  early 70's is now  tending  to  tail off. 
In  1981,  American  investment  in nine  of the  ten  EEC  countries 
increased  by  only  3%  on  the  total  of  76.6  thousand  million 
dollars  in  1980;  during  the  preceding  two  year3  the  increase 
had  been  17%  per  year.  The  percentage  increase  for  1981  was 
the  lowest  since  1970  and it is not  likely that  1982 will  see 
an  increase  on  the  1981  figure(3 ). 
However,  the  declining  rate  of  American  investment 
in  the  EEC  is  matched  by  a  general  fall  in  the  rate  of growth 
of  American  investments  abroad  in  1981.  These  investments 
stood at  221  thousand million dollars in 1981,  only  3.5% up  on 
1980  (as against+  14%  in 1979  and+  15%  in 1980). 
(1)  Source  :  figures  recently  quoted  by  a  member  of the American 
administration. 
(2)  See  table  4  appended. 
~)Source  :  US  Department  of Commerce. --------------------------------------------
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The  fall  in  American  investment  in  the  EEC  in  1981 
was  due  not  only  to  the  decline  in  the  number  of new  ventures, 
but  also  to  the  fact  that  the  revenue  from  foreign  subsidies 
was  not  reinvested  locally.  In  six  countries  (France,  Germany, 
Italy  and  Benelux)  new  investment  slumped  from  2. 5  thousand 
million  dollars  in  1980  to  500  million  in  1981;  reinvestment 
fell  to  500  million  from  an  annual  average  of  3.6  thousand 
million during  the  preceding  three  years. 
This  trend would  seem  to  indicate that many  American 
firms  now  regard  the  EEC  more  as  a  market  (for  their  exports) 
than  as  a  production  zone  (for their investments). 
To  explain  this  attitude  some  spokesmen  of American 
business circles put  forward  the  following  arguments  : 
One  of  the  main  attractions  that  the  EEC  has  held  for 
American  companies,  ever since it came  into existence,  has 
been  the  prospect  of  an  extensive  free  market.  But  progress 
towards  such  a  market  has  slackenedU).  The  Member  States are 
tending  to  look  increasingly  to  their  own  interests,  using 
for  this  purpose  public  procurement  policies,  technical 
barriers  and  varying  standards.  American  companies 
established  in  one  of  the  Community  countries  find  that 
their access  to  markets  in  other Member  States is restricted 
(for  instance  in  the  field  of  advanced  technology). 
- the  development  of  a  Community  company  law  affects  the 
operations  of  foreign  enterprises  within  the  Community  as 
well  as  Community  firms  themselves.  Even  where  it is still 
only  at  proposal  stage,  Community  company  law  is  causing 
deep  concern  amongst  American  businessmen.  The  main 
proposals  concerned  are  the  Vredeling  Draft  Proposal  and  the 
proposal  relating  to  company  accounts.  In  this  connection 
(1)  The  slow  progress  towards  a  single  European  market  is 
deplored  by  Community  businessmen  too. - 39  -
the  trade  unions  of  the  EEC  have  criticized  American 
companies.  They  regard  the  intervention  of  these  companies 
in  the  Community  legislative  process  as  excessive  and  ill-
advised. 
Many  American  industrialists now  consider  the  EEC,  in whole 
or in part,  to  be  a  high-cost  production  zone  compared with 
other investment  zones  in  the world,  including  the  US  itself 
in  some  cases.  This  is mainly because  of  the  level of social 
security contributions  required of employers,  but also,  more 
generally,  bec~use of  the  cost of  labour. 
In  view  of their feelings  on  these  matters,  American 
business  groups  will  probably  increasingly  lobby  their 
government  for  a  strict  commercial  policy  towards  Europe  in 
order  to  ensure  that  the  Com~unity market  remains  open  to  the 
goods  which  they  manufacture  in  the  United  States  and 
elsewhere. 
III.  LEGISLATION  AND  RECENT  TRENDS  IN  AMERICAN  COMMERCIAL 
POLICY 
The  main  American  laws  which  affect  EEC/United States trade 
The  most  striking feature  of  US  trade  policy  is  the 
authority conferred upon  Congress  by  the  Constitution.  Unlike 
EEC  negotiators,  even  if they  are  acting  under  the  mandate  of 
the  Member  States,  US  negotiators  cannot  commit  themselves  on 
certain important  matters  - any  agreement  they  make  is subject 
to  Congressional  approval.  All  negotiations  between  the  EEC 
and  the  United  States are  accordingly  somewhat  unbalanced  from 
the  outset. 
There  are  clashes  of  opinion  and  power  struggles 
between  the  various  bodies  of  the  US  Administration,  whose 
responsibilites are  not  always  clearly defined. - 40  -
The  US  Administration  has  several  bodies  dealing 
with  foreign  trade,  namely  :  the  Special  Trade 
RepresentativeU) (over  120  people),  the  Department  of Commerce 
(over  500  people),  the  International  Trade  Commission  ( ITC) 
(six political  "judges"  and  650  employees),  the  Congress,  the 
United  States Court  of International  Trade,  and  to  some  extent 
the  State  Department. 
American  firms  and  other  interested  parties  have  at 
their  disposal  a  wide  gamut  of  laws  designed  to  protect  them 
against  imports. 
To  this end,  American  law  provides 
dumping  and  countervailing  duty  suits  :  this  is  a  rapid 
procedure  whereby  American  firms  which  prove  injury  from 
imported  goods  sold  for  less  than  the  fair  pr~ce,  can obtain 
the  payment  of  sureties  for  imports  and  subsequently  anti-
dumping  measures; 
- the  safeguard  clause  (stricter  than  that  of  GATT  - applied 
at  times  of abnormal  increases  in  imports); 
- Section  301  of  the  Trade  Act,  enabling  the  President  to 
ensure  the  observance  of  rights  in  accordance  with  the 
Geneva  agreements  - it  provides  an  economic  interpretation 
of  these  rights  (employment  etc.);  a  businessman  who  brings 
a  suit is not  required  to  prove  injury; 
- Section  337  of  the  1930  Tariff  Act,  allowing  suits  to  be 
brought  against  any  form  of unfair  imports,  and  provides  for 
comprehensive  and  very  substantial  legal  remedies; 
(1)  The  President's personal  repreeentative  for  trade  talks. - 41  -
- Section  232  of  the  1962  Trade  Expansion  Act,  allowing 
investigations  to  be  made  into  imports  which  threaten 
"security"; 
- Section  302  of  the  Buy  American  Act,  which  has  not  been 
entirely  abolished  as  a  result  of  the  Tokyo  Round  - the 
President  is  obliged  to  consult  industry  before  throwing 
open  public  purchasing  to  international  competition;  the 
question  of the  states has  not  been  resolved. 
The  effect  ofseveral  of  these  mechanisms  is to  curb 
or even  stop  imports as soon  as  proceedings  are  opened,  since 
any  decisions  have  retrospective  effect,  and  there  is  the 
possibility of  temporary  safeguard measures. 
In  addition  to  these  laws,  imports  into  the  United 
States are  controlled by  the  following 
-trigger price  mechanism  (steel  prices arrangement); 
-anti-surge mechanism  (steel  tonnage); 
- customs  evaluation  (difficulties  continue  despite  the  GATT 
code)  and  classification; 
- the  nature  of  certain  standards  and  the  way  they  are 
applied,  e.g.  i~ the  foodstuffs  sector  (food  and  drugs),  the 
chemicals  sector  (Toxic  Substance  Act);  certain practices in 
the  wine  industry  should  also  be  mentioned  as  they  affect  a 
substantial  volume  of  EEC  exports; 
- voluntary  restraint  agreements  (e. g.  cars)  obtained  from 
some  foreign  competitors  thanks  to  American  economic  and 
political  weight. - 42  -
The  attitude  of  Congress  and  the  Administration  to  trade 
policy 
There  are  at  present  a  dozen  or  so  bills  before 
Congress,  designed  to  strengthen  American  trade  legislation 
with  a  view  to  improving  reciprocity for American  exports. 
The  general  idea  is  to  stipulate  that  retaliatory 
measures  shoul~  be  taken  when,  on  a  given  market,  American 
companies  do  not  have  the  freedom  of access  enjoyed  by  foreign 
companies  on  the  American  market.  The  aim  is thus  to build up 
sector-by-sector  and  country-by-country  trade  equilibrium. 
The  authors  of  these  bills  are  primarily  aiming  to 
oblige  Japan  to  open  up  its home  market  more.  However,  the  EEC 
is also  affected,  because  if these  bills became  law  they  would 
go  against  the  trade  agreements  concluded  in  the  past decades, 
which  are  based  on  non-discrimination between  countries  and  on 
mutual  concessions  which  do  not  necessarily  have  the  same 
sectoral  composition.  The  very  concept  of reciprocity  leads  to 
bilateralism.  Its  adoption  would  wipe  out  more  than  twenty 
years'  progress  in  the  organization  of world  trade. 
The  Administration  is  aware  of  the  rlifficul ties 
which  would  arise,  and  of  the  damage  which  might  be  caused  to 
the  mechanisms  of  GATT.  It  is  attempting  to  head  off  the 
discontent  of Congress  by  produCiTig,  in  collaboration with  the 
authors  of  the  abovementioned  bills,  legal  texts  which  are 
more  compatible  with  the  international  obligations  of  the 
United States. 
However,  it is  always  possible  that  American  trade 
policy will  be  tightened  up  by  new  laws  in  the  near  future. - 43  -
On  16  ,Tune  1982,  the  Senate  Finance  board  did  in 
fact  approve  a  bill which,  if it became  law,  would  introduce 
the  idea  of  reciprocity  into  American  Commercial  policy.  The 
administration  has  expressed  itself  in  favour  of  this  bill, 
merely  making  it  clear  that  it  would  oppose  legislation 
"compelling"  the  President  to  adopt  retaliatory  measures  in 
the  event  of non-reciprocity. 
The  position of business,  trade  unions  and  farmers 
vis-a-vis United States/Europe  problems 
In  the  USA  there  is  no  organization which  represents 
all  the  en~luyers;  hence  they  do  not  have  a  consistent  point 
of  view  as  regards  foreign  trade  in  general  and  trade  with 
Europe  in particular. 
The  organizations  (e.g.  Business  Round  Table);  which 
bring  together  very  large  companies  heavily  involved  abroad, 
generally  use 
although  some 
protectionism. 
their  influence  to  encourage  liberalism, 
important  sectors  are  waging  a  campaign  for 
The  employers'  organizations,  representing  a  large 
number  of  companiesU),  are  also  in  favour  of  free  trade  but 
generally  support  a  "hard"  commercial  policy,  i.e.  a  policy 
which  makes  every  effort  to  defend  American  interests 
- either by  protection against  imports  regarded  as  "unfair", 
or  by  an  aggressive  policy  aimed  at eliminating obstacles  to 
exports. 
In  the  second  case, 
Japan  in  mind. 
American  industry  mostly  has 
(1)  In particular  :  the  US  Chamber  of Commerce  and  the  National 
Association of Manufacturers. - 44  -
In  the  first  case  (competition  deemed  unfair),  its 
target  is  most  often  Europe  where  is  sees  manufacturers  as 
benefiting  increasingly  from  subsidies or multiple aid. 
American  industrialists  also  see  VAT  (which  has  no 
equivalent  in  the  United  States)  as  giving  their  European 
competitors  a  major general  advantage. 
In  recent  years  UNICE  and 
orgaciz3tions  in  America  have  held 
Europe/United  States  trade  problems 
discussed. 
the  main  employers' 
meetings,  at  which 
have  regularly  been 
Naturally,  the  American  unions  are  first  and 
foremost  sensitive  to  the  employment  problem.  This  greatly 
influences  their attitude  to  foreign  trade,  and  is why  several 
unions,  in  sectors hard hit by  the  recession,  are  joining with 
the  employers  to encourage  sectoral  protectionist action. 
On  various  occasions,  the  AFL-CIO  has  advocated 
measures  to  limit  imports.  However,  at  its  last  Congress  it 
recognized  the  importance  of  free  foreign  trade  for  the 
American  economy.  It  also  supports  the  draft  legislation 
designed  to  introduce  the  concept  of "reciprocity"  in  United 
States'  trade  relations. 
American  trade  unions,  in principle,  support  foreign 
investment  in  the  United  States  for  the  sake  of  employment 
(they  have  laid particular  pressure  on  Japanese  firms  to  set 
up  in  the  United  States).  However,  they  have  told  European 
trade unions  that certain  EEC  investors  who  have  preferred  to 
set  up  in  the  Southern States,  are  encouraging  practices  and 
legislation  which  limit  the  free  application  of  union  rights 
in  these  states. - 45  -
Regular  exchanges  of  view  between  American  and 
European  trade  unions  a11uw  rccipr·oeal  trade,  and  economic  and 
social  problems  to  be  raised,  and  should  contribute  to  a 
gradual  rapprochement  of views. 
Since  1971,  annual  meetings  have  also  been  held 
between  representatives  of  farmers  and  the  food  industry, 
including  cooperatives,  under  the  aegis  of  the  US  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  COPA  and  COGECA. 
These  reciprocal  briefing meetings  look  at  the  state 
of  the  agriculture  situation  and  the  different  markets, 
agricultural  policy  trends  in  the  EEC  and  the  US,  and 
bilateral  and  multilateral  trade  relations  in  the  farming 
sector. 
The  now  difficult  situation  of  American  farmers, 
combined  with  their electoral  muscle,  explains  (particularly 
with  the  elections  coming  in  November)  the  sharpness  of  the 
EEC/USA  confrontation  in  the  agricultural  sphere. 
It  seems,  however,  that  the  US  administration  is 
tending,  vis-a-vis agricultural  circles,  to shift onto  the  EEC 
and  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  the  responsibility  for  a 
situation due  largely  to  internal  US  factors. 
American  farmers  have  seen  their  incomes  fall  in  the 
last  three  years  (they claim  that  their net  income  is now  half 
what  it was  in 1979).  This  is due  to  the  Government's  economic 
policy  (high  interest  rates,  greater  debt  burden  and 
production  costs).  The  Department  of'  Agricul  turP.  estimates 
that  the  debt  burden  of  American  farmers  at  the  beginning  of 
1982  was  double  (in current dollars)  what  it was  in  1975.  The 
stoppage  of  wheat  deliveries  to  the  Soviet  Union  was  very 
expensive  for American  agriculture  (according  to  some  American 
sources,  856  million dollars  in  lost  income  and  310,000  jobs). - 46  -
Several  sectoral  measures  taken  by  the  American  Government 
have  also  had  negative  effects  (e.g.  on  milk  and  sugar). 
Finally, 
dollar  is 
the  1970s 
and  most  important,  the  high  exchange  rate  of  the 
a  major  handicap  for American  farm  exports  which  in 
enjoyed  the  crucial  support  of  a  weak  dollar (1). 
IV.  THE  COMMUNITY  ATTITUDE  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES 
The  Community  has  become  aware  of  the  need  to  equip 
itself with  commercial  policy  instruments  on  a  par  with  those 
possessed  by  the  United  States,  and  progress  towards  this g0al 
has  been  made  over  the  last  few  years.  But  its political  and 
institutional weakness  all  too  often prevent it from  deploying 
these  instruments with  maximum  effect.  Before  they  are  brought 
into  play,  external  negotiations  have  to  be  prP-ceded  by  a 
round  of  internal  negotiations.  The  Member  States often  do  not 
see  eye-to-eye  on  this  issue.  Although  the  Community 
institutions  can  defend  themselves 
external  pressures,  they  are  not 
reasonably  well  against 
really  geared  to  take 
aggressive  action  or  to  take  the  initiative in order  to  secure 
concessions  of benefit  to  Community  exporters.  Indeed,  it is 
the  American  Administration  which  is  currently  pursuing  a 
resolutely  aggressive  commercial  policy. 
Furthermore,  in  many  instances  the  Commission  does 
not  have  enough  staff  to  carry  out  all  its  duties  in  the 
sphere  of  commercial  policy  (e.g. 
procedure) . 
the  anti-dumping 
( 1) An  aide  of  the  US  Secretary  of  State  for  Agriculture, 
Dr.  G.  Edward  SCHUH,  said  on  15  November  1978  at  the  US 
annual  agricultural  conference  that  an  overvalued  currency 
had  the  same  effect  as  an  import  subsidy  and  an  export 
duty,  whereas  an  undervalued  currency  had  the  same  effect 
as  an  export  subsidy  and  an  import  duty.  He  felt  that  the 
high  level  of  American  agricultural  exports  in  1977  was 
mainly  due  to  a  weaker  dollar. - 47  -
Industrial,  economic  and  monetary  policies are still 
largely  the  preserve of  the  Member  States.  These  policies are 
increasingly  affecting  trade  patterns,  but  as  the  Community 
has  little  or  no  control  over  them,  it  cannot  (unlike  the 
United  States)  use  its  full  economic  or 
defend  its  interests  (even  though  its 
overtaking  that of the  United  States)~). 
political  clout  to 
GNP  is  gradually 
However,  the  Community  has  for  some  time  been  taking 
a  tougher  line  on  trade with  the  United States.  Over  the  past 
three  years,  for  instance, 
of  anti-dumping  procedures 
chemical  products)  from  the 
the  Community  has  opened  a  number 
against  imports  (particularly  of 
United  States;  in  several  cases 
these  have  led  to  the  imposition  of  temporary  or  permanent 
anti-dumping dilties. 
A  further  instance  occurred  last  April,  when  the 
Community  requested  the  GATT  to  recommend,  in  accordance  with 
Article  XXIII,  that  United  States  legislation  on  DISCs 
(Domestic  International  Sales Corporations)  be  made  compatible 
with  the  GATT  rules.  This  legislation allows  tax  concessions, 
which  effectively  constitute  export  aids, 
earnings of  US  businessmen, 
on  the  export 
More  recently,  the  Community  again  had  recourse  to 
Article  XXIII,  when  it  started  consultations  under  GATT  on 
maize  gluten  feed.  The  Community  wishes  to  renegotiate  the 
exemption granted  in 1975  for its imports  from  the  US  of maize 
gluten  (of which  the  United States is a  major  supplier). 
( l) According  to  the  London  NOMURA  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE, 
Community  GNP  in  1980  was  equivalent  to  120%  of  United 
States GNP.  Subsequent  changes  in exchange  rates will  have 
inevitably affected these  figures,  however. - 48  -
V.  PARTICULARLY  CONTROVERSIAL  AREAS 
Agriculture 
American  agriculture  and world markets(1) 
The  United States plays  a  dominant  role  in the world 
agricultural  economy.  Its position in world exports is  50% 
for  wheat,  60%  for  maize,  and  81%  for  soya.  These  are  all 
foodstuffs vital  for  human  consumption  and  for  animal  feed. 
Furthermore,  the  United  States  backs  its  farm 
production  and  export  capacity  with  considerable  powers  of 
political  and  economic  persuasion;  food  aid  and  credits are  an 
effective  springboard for  commercial  exports. 
Average  US  total  agricultural  exports  have  been  as 
follows  (2)  : 
for  1948-59  1.8  thousand  mill ion dollars 
for  1960-72  3.5  thousand million dollars 
for  1973-78  15.0  thousand million dollars. 
In  1981  us  Agricultural  exports  were  worth 
43.3  thousand  million  dollars  (18.5%  of  all  exports).  The 
positive  agricultural  trade  balance  of  26.5  thousand  million 
dollars helps  to  offset  the  non-agricultural  trade  deficit  of 
66.2  thousand million dollars(3). 
Agricultural  exports  a  marginal  factor  in  the 
1960s  - have  thus  become  essential  to American  economy.  It is 
therefore  not  surprising  that  the  US  Administration  uses  all 
(1)  See  table  5  appended. 
(2) Figures  quoted  by  A.  REVEL  and  C.  RIBOUD  in  "Les  Etats-Unis 
et la strategie alimentaire mondiale". 
(3) Figures  from  US  Department  of Agriculture - 49  -
the  means  at  its disposal  to maintain  and  if possible  increase 
them,  and  that  it  is  stepping  up  its drive  towards  the  EEC, 
which  has  proved  an  excellent outlet. 
The  United States and  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
American  agricultural  exports  to  the  EEC  have  risen 
steadily over  the  last  25  years 
1.5  thousand mill ion dollars  in  1 95"/ 
2  thousand  million dollars  in  1967 
4.4  thousand million dollars in  1973 
6.7  thousand million dollars  in  1976  (to  the  10  Member  States) 
9  thousand  mill ion  dollars in  1981,  leaving  the  EEC  with  a 
trade  deficit of 6.7  thousand million dollars. 
One  of  the  reasons  for  this  deficit  is  that  the 
offensive  strategy  of  the  United  States  is  accompanied  by  a 
defensive  policy(l)(the  GATT  waiver,  stiff  quotas,  health-
protection barriers,  and  so  on). 
recurring 
Critic  ism  of 
theme  of 
the  Common  Agricultural  Pol icy 
American  commercial  policy. 
is  a 
The 
Administration  is  trying  to  make  major  cuts  in  public 
expenditure  on  agriculture  (which  has  in  fact  contracted  over 
the  last  few  years)(8.  It is therefore  understandably  becoming 
increasingly  vociferous  in  its  condemnation  of  rising 
expenditure  on  agriculture  in  the  Community. 
( 1)  Extract  from  a  speech  by  Mr  SHARP,  Agricultural  Counsellor, 
United  States mission  to  the  EEC  (4  February 1982). 
( 2)  In  spite  of this,  it would  appear  that  public  expenditure 
started  to  rise  sharply  once  again  in  1982.  According  to 
figures  published  recently  in  the  magazine "U.S.  NEWS", 
public  expenditure  in  1982  will  be  three  times  that  in 
1981. - 50  -
The  feeling  that  the  Community  is helping  itself to 
more  than  its fair  share of  the  international  market,  thanks 
to subsidies,  is becoming  increasingly widespread  amongst  the 
Americans.  They  point  out  that  in  1981  their  worldwide 
agricultural  exports  rose  by  nearly  13%,  but would  have  risen 
even  more  had  it not  been for  the competition  from  subsidized 
EEC  exports. 
In  recent years American  farmers'  organizations have 
brought  suits  ~section 301)  against  imports of  sugar,  tinned 
and  dried fruit,  chickens,  pasta and  flour.  The  United States 
an:  3.lso  questioning  the  Community's  preferential  tar:i.ff  on 
citrus  fruits  imported  from  Mediterranean  countries.  They 
maintain  that  the  agreements  between  the  Community  and 
Mediterranean  countries  are  in  breach  of  GATT  and  thus 
threaten  the  Casey/Soames  arrangement  of  1973  whereby  the 
Community  undertook  not  to  expand  these  agreements,  in return 
for  which  the  United  States  dropped  its  claim  that  they 
contravened  GATT.  Consequently  the  EEC's  whole  Mediterranean 
policy  could  be  jeopardized by  the  United States. 
Broadly,  the  Americans  appear  to  be  intensifying 
their critic  isms  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  as  they 
did at the  beginning of  the  Tokyo  Round  negotiations.  At  this 
point,  we  should  also  take  into account  American  reactions to 
the  possible  introduction of  a  Community  tax  on vegetable oils 
in view  of  the  accession of Spain. 
The  United  States  are  obviously  worried  about  any 
new  Common  Agricultural  Policy measures  liable  to  hamper  their 
exports  to  the  Community.  By  virtue of the  difference between 
Community  and world agricultural  prices,  the  Community  market 
is  in  fact  vei'y  valuable;  it is clearly  in  the  interests  of 
American  suppliers  that  access  to  it  should  be  as  free  as 
possible. - 51  -
The  competitiveness of American  agriculture 
The  position  of  the  United  States  in  agricultural 
trade  and  the  influence it exerts  on  world markets  would  seem 
to  suggest  - bearing  in  mind  the  low  world  prices  - that 
American  agriculture is extremely competitive. 
Undoubtedly,  thanks  to  the  size  of  its  farms, 
American  agriculture has  a  high productivity per man.  However, 
its productivity per acre  is much  lower  than  that of Community 
farming which has to be rr.or'f'  ir.tensi  ve (the area per man is smaller). 
Of  course,  the  size  of  American  farms  also  allows 
farmers  - whose  energy  has  to be  admired  - to  use  large  scale 
techniques,  to  keep  financial  reserves  to  offset  possible 
losses  and  to  have  spare  land  easily  available  if  the  need 
arises  (between  1972  and  1974,  24  million  "spare"  hectares 
were  replanted).  This  gives  American  agriculture  great 
flexibility  when  it  comes  to  adjusting  to  fluctuations  in 
demand. 
However, 
the  only  reason::; 
commercial  and  technical  factors  are  not 
agriculture  in  the  United  States  also 
receives  considerable  Federal  aid  (compensatory  payments  to 
producers,  aid  for  internal  transport,  special  export credits 
at  subsidized  interest  rates,  etc.).  The  main  difference 
between  American  aid  and  that  granted  by  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  is  that  the  former  is  le3s  transparent. 
Recent  studies  suggest  that  they  are  comparable. 
Steel 
From  the  beginning  of  1980,  the  American  steel 
industry  brought  a  number  of  anti-dumping  suits  against  EEC 
countries,  which  had  a  noticeable effect  on  EEC  sales  to  the 
United States.  These  suits were  not  concluded,  as  in September - 52  -
of  the  same  year  an  agreement  was  made  between  the  European 
Community  and  the  American  administration  re-establishing, 
with  a  few  changes,  the  "trigger  prices"  system.  (This 
involved  the  fixing  of  "trigger  prices"  calculated  on  the 
basis of  the  most  efficient producers'  costs,  in this case  the 
Japanese.  Any  sales at these prices were  presumed  to  have  been 
made  at  "fair  value",  i.e.  they  could  not  be  subject  to 
dumping  suits). 
This  system  was  viable if t:he  "trigge~' pr.i.cA"  levels 
fixed  for  each  product  allowed  normal  penetration  of  the 
American  import  market  - i.e.  they  had  to be  relatively close 
to  the  actual  prices on  the  American  market.  In fact,  in late 
1980  and  1981,  the  American  administration  distorted  the 
system  by  fixing  the  "trigger  prices"  at  at  least  10%  above 
real  prices  on  the  American  market, 
embargo. 
creating  an  effective 
In mid-1981,  American  companies  launched  a  campaign 
for  the  non-application  of  this  system,  which  was  virtually 
unworkable  and  very  different  from  the  one  set  up  by  the 
Commission  as  part  of  its  arrangements  with  non-member 
countries  (who  benefit  from  a  real  penetration  margin  when 
entering  Community  markets). 
This  campaign  took  shape,  at  the  beginning  of 
January  1982,  with  the  filing of  a  number  of suits  on  almost 
all  European  exports,  and  covering  all  Community  countries 
involved  in steel  trading with  the  United  States.  These  suits 
involved  both  dumping  and  countervailing duties.  They  were  to 
be  accompanied,  in  the  following  weeks  by  different suits on  a 
whole  range  of  other  products  such  as  wire  rod  and  special 
steels. ·-·--·--· ---------------------------
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On  11  June,  following  the  US  steelmen's  suit,  the  US 
Trade  Department  decided  to  apply  countervailing  duties  to 
steel  imports  from  Europe.  These  duties  vary  from  country  to 
country. 
For  its  part,  on  22  June  the  Council  of  the 
Communities  voiced  deep  disquiet  at  the  US  Government's 
decision  (which  had  been  followed  on  18  June  by  the 
announcement  .:;f  the  embargo  decisioh  on  machinery  intended for 
the  Soviet  gas  pipeline  being  produced  in  Europe  under 
American  licence). 
On  28  and  29  June,  the  European  Council  nonetheless 
expressed  a  wish  to  leave  open  all  possibilities  of  a 
compromise  with  the  United States,  and  not  be  responsible  for 
transforming  the  conflict into  an  outright  trade war. 
Negotiations  were  possible  up  until  23  July,  as 
until  this  date  (a  month  before  the  introduction  of 
countervailing  duties),  Washington  could  have  stopped  their 
effective  enforcement,  if  the  concessions  proposed  by  the 
Community  seemed  likely  to satisfy the  American  steelmen. 
The  talks held  in early .July  by  the  Commission,  and 
then  bilaterally  by  the  Member  States  (more  especially  the 
four  countries  most  involved  :  United  Kingdom,  France,  Italy 
and  Belgium),  failed because  the  US  Government  felt  that  the 
proposed  undertakings  to  limit  European  exports  to  the  United 
States were  fixert  too  high  (reducing  their totals  by  10%  over 
three years) . 
In  the  face  of  this  deadlock,  the  Ten  decided  to 
open  general  negotiations,  and  on  24  July  the  Council 
instructed  the  Commission  to  negotiate  on  its own,  on  behalf 
of  the  Community,  a  general  steel  agreement  with  the  United 
States  to  create  a  "steel peace"  until  the  end of 1985. - 54  -
Since  then,  an  agreement  has  been  reached  between 
the  European  Community  and  the  American Administration,  but it 
will  not  come  into  force  unless  the  suits  brought  by  the 
American steel  industry are withdrawn. 
The  American  steel  industry  is  currently working at 
less than  half capacity  (43%).  Around  a  third  of  its workers 
(111,000)  were  unemployed  at  the  beginning  of  July,  with 
22,000  on  short  time.  However,  figures  show  that  European 
importo  are  no~ to blame  for this. 
In  1977-78,  the  US  market  share  of  European  steel 
products  was  7.1%.  In  1979  and  1980  this fell  to  5.2%  and  4.2% 
respectively.  In  1981  it  rose  again  to  6.9%,  but  this  was 
because  European  imports  in  1980  were  reduced  by  the  first  US 
STEEL  suits. 
EEC  sales for  1981  are  equivalent  to  those  of Japan. 
They  are  less  than  the  total  sales of  other  countries,  which 
exceeded  7%  of the  US  market.  Ten  years  ago,  the  EEC  accounted 
for  aro•.md  40%  of  total  imports.  Since  then,  this  share  has 
ben  fal~ing continually,  and  in  1981  was  little more  than  30%. 
In  fact,  the  increase  in total  American  imports  is mainly  due 
to  new  suppliers  such  as  Canada,  South  Korea,  Brazil, 
Argentina  and  South Africa. 
Petrochemicals  and  synthetic  fibres 
The  first  difficulties  in  this  sector  emerged  in 
1980  in  connection  with  American  exports  to  the  EEC  of  man-
made  fibres  and  intermediate  petrochemical  products,  which 
were  helped  by  an  artificially  low  oil price.  The  UK  was  the 
first  to  react  (in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  Common 
Commercial  Policy)  by  imposing  a  quota  on  certain  fibres. 
Community  anti-dumping  measures  were  then  introduced - 55  -
throughout  the  EEC  on  imports  of  fibres  and  intermediate 
petrochemical  products.  Some  of  these  measures  are  still  in 
force. 
The  increase  in  American  hydrocarbon  prices  from 
January  1981  (deregulation)  led  to  a  gradual  ·aligrur.ent  of 
American  prices  on  the  international  price,  thus  putting  an 
end  to  a  two-pr.ice  system which  was  not  defensible  under  GATT. 
But  this  measure  only  partially  defused  the  conflict  as  the 
price  of  natural  gas  in  the  US  remained  frozen  well  below  the 
international  price.  In  the  USA,  unlike  Europe,  ethylene  - the 
base  for  numerous  plastics  - is  produced  mainly  from  natural 
gas.  The  difference  in  prices  therefore  gives  the  American 
petrochemicals  industry  a  major  advantage  over  its  foreign 
competitors.  In  the  States deregulation of natural  gas prices 
is  fraught  with  awkward  economic  and  political  problems  and 
has  been  the  focus  of  EEC-US  consultations for  several  months. 
It will  be  a  very  slow process. 
Meanwhile,  chronic  difficulties  are  looming  due  to 
the  agressive  attitude  of  American  manufacturers,  spare 
capacity  worldwide  and  the  expansion  of  the  petrochemical 
industry  in the  Third World.  The  EC  Commission  has  repeatedly 
alerted  the  American  Administration  to  the  importance  it 
attaches  to  this  issue.  Since  December  1980  the  EEC/US  Working 
Party  on  the  Petrochemical  Industry  has  met  three  times.  In 
late  1981  there  was  an  exchange  of  correspondence  between  the 
Commission  President  and President Reagan's  commercial  attache 
and  last  April  the  Commission  sent  the  American  authorities  a 
"note  verbale". 
The  European  Community  continues  to  apply  its anti-
dumping  and  anti-subsidy measures  with  regard  to  the  following 
US  products - 56  -
- textured polyester yarns 
- non-textured polyester yarns 
- textured polyester yarn  fabrics 
- polyacrylic  textile fibres  and  continuous  filament  tow. 
US  exports of clothing and  textiles to  the  Community, 
which  caused  serious  problems  as  late as  in 1980,  have  fallen 
sharply  from  1.3  thousand million  to  1.1  thousand million UA. 
One  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  is  the  firmness  of 
the  ciollar,  which  affectE  the  competitiveness  of  Ameriean 
industry. 
On  the  other  hand,  Community  textile  and  clothing 
exports  to  the  United  States  increased  from  700  million  in 
1980  to  1  thousand  million  UA  in  1981  thanks  to  the  dollar's 
strength. 
In  previous  years,  however,  Community  exports  had 
more  or  less  stagnated,  mainly  due  to  the  level  of  US  customs 
duties.  According  to  GATT  calculations  these  duties  are  still 
markedly  higher  than  the  Community's  even  after  the  Tokyo 
Round.  This  can  be  seen  from  the  following  table  (averaged 
weighted  rates  of  duty)  : 
USA  Community 
Yarns  9.1%  7.0% 
Fabrics  11.5%  10.6% 
Simple  ready-made  apparel  7.4%  7.6% 
Clothing  and  clothing 
accessories  22.7%  13.3% 
In  addition,  following  the  recent publication by  the 
US  authorities  of  a  document  on  the  amendment  of  customs 
procedures,  there  is the  danger  that  a  wide  interpretation of - 57  -
the  term  "fancy  apparel"  might  cause  a  further  increase  in 
customs  duties  on  imported  items  of clothing.  The  Commission 
regards  this  amendment  as  unjustified  and  has  informed  the 
American  administration accordingly. 
Possible difficulties in  the  car sector 
There  l
. ,,  ,,  no  commercial  dispute  with  the  United 
States  in  this  area  at  present  (despite  different  technical 
specifications  which  can  constrain  sales  of  European  cars). 
Two  points  do  arise,  however  : 
- agreements  between  American  manufacturers  and  the  Japanese 
could  indirectly  disadvantage  European  manufacturers 
(diversion  of  surplus  Japanese  cars  to  European  and  other 
markets) ( 1); 
there  is  a  likelihood  of  more  i.ntense  competition  in  the 
future  from  medium-sized  American  cars designed for European 
tastes.  Recent  years  have  seen  heavy  investment  by  American 
investors  in  this  sec tor  in  the  United  States,  Europe  and 
the  rest of  the  world. 
Potential difficulties in  the  advanced  technology  sector 
Progress  in  advanced  technology  (particularly 
sectors  such  as  micro-electronics,  data  processing, 
telecommunications,  fibre-optics  and  bio-technological 
methods)  is  currently  more  rapid  in  the  United  States  (and 
Japan)  than  in  the  EEC  and  that  this  trend will  continue. 
Disputes  might  be  engendered  by  European 
determination  to  develop  these  activities  independently. 
Already,  customs  duties  are  often  higher  in  the  EEC  than  in 
( 1)  On  this  point  Bee  the  Committee  1 s  Opinion  on  Economic  and 
Commercial  Relations  between  the  European  Community  and 
Japan  (OJ  No.  C  230  of 10  September 1981). - 58  -
the  United  States(1)(for  example,  17%  as  opposed  to  4.2%  for 
semi-conductors).  Furthermore,  the  Community's  industrial 
policy,  like  that of  the  individual  Member  States,  seeks  to 
promote  growth  in  advanced  technology  sectors  - if necessary 
by  preferential.  measures. 
The  development  of  such  a  policy  will  probably 
create  tension  between  the  llni ted  States  and  Europe. 
(Page  60  on  future  GATT  negotiations). 
Under  the  pressure  of  competition,  from  Japan  in 
particular,  the  USA  is  currently  mounting  a  joint  research 
campaign  in  key  areas  such  as  integrated circuits.  In  recent 
months,  and  apparently without  running  into  any  problems with 
the  anti-trust  legislation,  numerous  new  groups  have  been 
formed  by  industry,  aided  by  the  universities,  for  the  purpose 
of pooling basic  research.  Thus,  by  way  of example 
- in  1981  the  Semiconductor Research  Cooperative  was  set  up  to 
pool  basic  research  into  VLSI  (very  large  scale  integrated 
circuits); 
- in  Silicon  Valley  17  firms  joined  together  to  set  up  a 
centre  for  very  advanced  VLSis  on  the  campus  of  Stanford 
University;  they  endowed  it  with  13  million  dollars,  to 
which  a  further  8  million were  added  in  federal  s~bsidies; 
- in  North  Carolina  6  research  institutes  founded  a  joint 
laboratory  which  they  funded  to  the  tune  of  24  million 
dollars; 
- in  March  1982  the  Massachusetts  Congress  initiated 
discussions  on  a  laboratory  to  be  set  up  by  eight 
universities,  thanks  to  a  20 million dollar subsiJy(2), 
(l) and  in Japan. 
( 2) Information  drawn  from  the  RAMSES  82  report  of  the  French 
Institute for  Internatioral Relations. - 59  -
Europe  is,  however,  well-placed  where  software  is 
concerned.  This  sphere  of activity is gaining  in  importance  as 
microprocessors  improve  and  their  cost  falls  (the  American 
airforce currently  spends  more  than  80%  of its data processing 
budget  on  software). 
But  is this field,  as  with  integrated circuits,  it 
is still  the  USA  which  sets the  pace. 
VI.  FU~URE GATT  NEGOTIATIONS 
Importance  and  shortcomings of  GATT 
Since it was  first  set  up,  thirty-five years  ago, 
GATT  has  been  the  pre-eminent  instrument  for  promoting  in~ 
ternational  trade  in  goods  and  dealing  with  disputes  in 
this  field.  Unfortunately,  it  is  an  instrument  which 
is  at  times  misused,  and  which  contains  a  number  of 
flaws.  As  its  members  h;;wc  not  attained  the  same 
degree  of  economic  development  and  do  not  have  the  same 
socio-economic  organization,  the  uniform  application  of  GATT 
principles  is  not  possible.  In  particular,  as  GATT  cannot 
apply  real  penalties,  it can  be  considered little more  than  a 
round  table  for disucssions.  In  the  absence  of  the  EEC/United 
States  trade  a.greement,  however,  GATT  (inter alia)  has  the 
advantage  of  providing  a  framework  for  commercial 
confrontation between  these  two  trade  partners. 
The  application  of  the  Tokyo  Round  agreements  by  the  United 
States  ru1d  the  (EEC  anti-dumping  measures,  public  procurement 
and  standards,  etc.) 
The  United  States  and  the  EEC,  1 ike  their  main 
trading  partners,  have  gradually  incorporated  into  national 
legislations  the  undertakings  made  in Geneva  (1979)  at  the  end - 60  -
of  the  Tokyo  Round  Negotiations.  Although  Community 
implementation  arrangements  pose  no  problem,  the  same  cannot 
be  said for  the  United States. 
With  respect  to tariffs,  the  United  States have  made 
a  number  of  nomenclature  changes,  which  have  led  to  duty 
increases considered unjustified by  the  Community. 
In  the non-tariff sector,  the  United  States have  put 
their  own  interpretation  on  a  number  cf  clauses  in  the  new 
GATT  codes  (definition of  "injury"  caused  by  dumping,  and  of 
"aid"  in  the  section  on  subsidies  and  countervailing duties). 
These  differences  in  interpretation  add  fuel  to  the  current 
"trade war"  between  the  United States and  the  Community  in the 
steel  sector.  As  regards  standards  and,  even  more,  public 
purchasing,  the  United  States are  only  really bound  at federal 
level,  and  their attempts  ("best  endeavours"  according  to  the 
GATT  definition)  to  enforce  GATT  codes  in  the  individual 
States could  hardly  be  described  as  highly effective. 
The  American  project  to  give  a  fresh  impulse  to  GATT 
negotiations 
At  the  United  States'  instigation,  the  Contracting 
Parties  to  GATT  will  hold  a  ministerial  meeting  in  Geneva  next 
November.  This  will  be  the  first  such  meeting  since  the  one 
held  in  1973  which  launched  the  Tokyo  Round. 
The  American  initiative covers  both  the  agricultural 
sector  (the  United  States  would  like  an  official  challenge  to 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  and  its export  refu~ds)  and  the 
sectors  of  international  investments, 
technology. 
services  and  advanced 
Excluding agriculture,  the  United States'  objective 
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- to  progress  from  the  liberalization  of  international  trade 
in  goods  - n  p roees£;  ~>e l  in  mot. ion  as  a  result  of  previous 
tarjff  and  non-tariff  negotiations  (!JiJlon  Round,  Kennedy 
Round  and  Tokyo  Round)  to  the  liberalization  of 
internationa!  trade  in  services  insurance,  banking, 
transport,  engineering,  cross-frontier data flows,  etc.  The 
OECD  began  to  analyze  and  compile  information  in  this  area 
some  years  ago,  and  its findings  could  be  used  by  GATT; 
- to  provide  US  citizens  who  invest  abroad  with  the  maximum 
freedom  of action.  They  consider  that  in  this  respect  their 
rules  and  attitude  are  more  liberal  than  those  of  most  of 
thej r  partners  and  it  is  true  that  foreign  investors  have 
more  or  less  open  access  to  the  US,  both  when  they  set  up 
business  and  i.n  their  subsequent  freedom  of  action,  in 
particular  as  regards  the  movement  of  capital.  Therefore 
they  are  looking  to  other  countries  to  liberalize  and 
consolidate  their legislation; 
- to  promote  t!le  interests  of  their  exporters  of  advanced 
technology  products  one  of  the  aims  of  the  new  trade 
legislation  u:1der  discussion  in  Congress  is  to  give  the 
President  specific  powers  to  negotiate  in this field. 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  liberalization  of 
international  trade  in  services  (a  sector  for  which  there  is 
no  multilateral  arrangement  at  present)  and  international 
investments  can  further  economic  and  social  development,  just 
as  the  liberalization of  international  trade  in goods  has  done 
over recent  decades.  In  principle,  therefore,  the  economic  and 
social  interest  groups  of  the  EEC  should  be  in  favour. 
Nevertheless  the  following  points  must  be  examined  first  : 
Before  opening  a  new  round 
advisable  to  ensure  that  the 
agreements  is satisfactory? 
of  negotiations 
application  of 
is 
the 
it  not 
present - 62  -
- Will  it  not  be  necessary  to  guarantee  that  "second-level" 
commitments  (e.g.  of  federal  authorities  on  behalf  of 
individual  states)  will  be  more  binding  in  the  services 
sector than  they  were  for  trade  in goods? 
- What  can  we  expect of negotiations which  will  not  cover  many 
of the  countries which  impose  barriers  to  trade  in  services 
(development  countries  and  Eastern bloc  countries)?  Even  now 
it would  seem  that  countries  such  as  Brazil  and  India  are 
opposed  to  any  negotiatL:ms  on  services.  The  same  ap~lies to 
Canada as  far as  investment  is concerned. 
Although  the  Community's  general  objective  is  to 
preserve  past  achievements  and,  therefore,  to  discourage 
protectionism,  at  the  moment  it seems  to  want  the  forthcoming 
Ministerial  conference  to  "keep  a  low  profile".  According  to 
the  Community,  this conference  could have  three basic  aims  : 
- a  formal  commercial  declaration; 
- a  set  of  decisions  to  be  taken  in  the  short-term 
implementation  of  the  GATT  safeguard  clause  (Article  XIX), 
tariff and  non-tariff  measures  in  agriculture,  settling  of 
disputes  and  preferential  arrangements  for  developing 
countries; 
a  long-term  work  schedule  the  United  States  wishes  to 
discuss  services  and  international  investments,  whereas  the 
Community  hopes  to  deal  with  access  to  raw  materials, 
monetary  dumping  and  trade  reciprocity  etc.;  both  sides 
seem,  however,  to be  in agreement  about  discussing textile 
products  and  imitation. - 63  -
VII.  MONETARY  PROBLEMS  AND  ECONOMIC  POLICY  PROBLEMS  AFFECTING 
EEC/UNITED  STATES  RELATIONS 
Currencies  and  interest rates 
At  the  end  of  the  70's  the  undervaluation  of  the 
dollar  created  difficulties  fo~  the  EEC  insofar  as  it 
artificially  bolstered  the  competitiveness  of  American 
exports. 
President  Reagan's  policy  of  economic  reform  has 
imposed  further  strain on  relations with  the  Community  in  the 
areas of interest rates and  exchange  rates  ; 
States, 
The  tight  monetary  pol icy  followed  by  the  United 
which  involves  high  interest  rates,  has  had  a 
depressive  effect  on  the  Community  economy. 
offers Community  governments  the  choice  between 
In  theory  it 
- raising  interest  rates  in  line  with  the  Americans,  at  the 
risk of choking  off any  economic  recovery,  and 
fixing  their rates  independently,  at  the  risk of causing  an 
outflow  of  capital,  thereby  jeopardizing  their  own 
currencies. 
In  practice,  European  governments  do  not  have  the 
means  to  follow  a  genuinely  separate policy  Oo  interest rates, 
regardless  of  interest  rates  in  the  United  States.  Such  a 
policy would  entail  restrictions on  capital  movements.  And  the 
views  of  the  Member  States  are  not  sufficiently  alike  to 
enable  such  measures  to  be  taken.  As  a  result,  attempts  to 
reflate  European  economies  are  hampered  by  high  interefit 
rates. - 64  -
Four  points  are,  howevet',  worth  mentioning 
A  number  of  factors  peculiar  to  European  economies  exert 
upward  pressure  on  interest  rates  (inflation  not  properly 
under  control,  budget  and  trade  deficits  and  lack  of 
confidence  among  businessmen). 
- On  the  other  hand,  certain  European  countri.es  are  able  to 
pursue  a  policy  of  relative  moderation  in  the  area  of 
interest  rates,  since  they  are  in  a  strong  position  as 
regards  inflation and  external  bal<:tnce. 
- The  American  budg,=t  deficit  is widely  held  to  be  one  of  the 
main  upward  pressures  on  interest  rates.  It  should 
nevertheless  be  stressed that,  in  terms  of  GNP,  the  deficit 
is higher  on  average  in  the  EEC  than  in  the  United States(D. 
It is  because  of  the  weakness  of  saving  that  this  deficit 
weighs  so  heavily  on  the  capital  market. 
- The  American  tax  system  (in  particular the  deductibility of 
private  individual's debts)  makes  it easier for  Americans  to 
accept  high  interest  rates  and  reduces  their  real  impact. 
This  is not  the  case  with  the  EEC  tax  system. 
There  has  been  a  conspicuous  drop  in  short-term 
interest  rates  in  the  United States since  August. 
The  high  exchange  rate  and  volatility of  the  dollar 
are  a  constraint  on  European  economic  policies  and  place  a 
burden  on  the  EEC  balance  of  payments  (the  percentage  of 
imports  paid  for  in  dollars  varies  between  25%  and  40%, 
depending  on  the  Member  State).  Since  the  election  of 
President  Reagan,  concerted  planning  between  the  central 
(1)  About  3%  for  the  States  but  more  than  10%  for  some  EEC 
countries. - 65  -
American  and  European  banks  appears  to  have  come  to  an  end. 
The  American  authorities claim  that  they will  not  intervene  on 
the  exchange  markets,  save  under exceptional  ci.rcumstances. 
The  recent  Commission  proposals  to  strengthen  the 
European  Monetary  System  seek  to  re-establish  regular 
concertation  between  the  American  and  European  monetary 
authorities.  The  recent Western  su~mit took  th3  same  line.  It 
is still  too  early  to  judge  whether  these  proposals  will  in 
fact  be  followed  ~p. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  a 
strong  dollar  reduces  the  competitiveness  of  US  goods  in 
Europe,  and  increases  the  competitiveness  of  Community 
products  on  the  American  market  and  in  other  countries  whose 
currency is  linked  to  the  dollar. 
If  current  disagreements  between  Europe  and  the 
United  States  over  interest  rates  and  monetary  policy 
continue,  there  is  the  danger  that  they  will  widen  the  rift 
within  the  Ccmmunity  between  those  governments  which  give 
priority  to  monetarist  policy,  and  those  governments  which 
feel  that  it is  necessary  to  stimulate  demand  as  a  means  of 
combating  unemployment. 
Consensus  on  export  credit rates 
Without  a  standardization  of  the  terms  of  export 
credits for  trade with  developing  and  Eastern  bloc  countries, 
Western  countries  would  get  involved  in  expensive  competition 
in this area.  In order  to allay  the  serious disadvantages  that 
this  would  create,  Western  countries  reached  a  consensus  in 
OECD  negotiations  in  1977. - 66  -
In  the  light  of  world-wide  increases  in  interest 
rates  in  recent  years,  the  United States  have  put  very  heavy 
pressure  on  their Western  trading  partners  - and  rivals  - to 
align  their export  credit rates more  closely  on  rates obtained 
on  their domestic  markets. 
After  ~  year  of  talks,  a  consensus  was  reached  on 
the  following  basis  an  increase  in  the  minimum  interest 
rates  charged  by  indus·~  rial  ized  countries  ( th~se  rates  vary 
according  to  the  categories  into which  the  beneficiary country 
fa] ls);  and  changes  in  the  rJistri'1ution  of  beneficiaries 
between  the  three  categories  of  "relatively  rich", 
"intermediate"  or  "poor". 
Thus,  at  least  until  1  May  1983,  when  this 
commitment  expires,  one  major  source  of friction  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Community  will  no  longer  be  part  of  the 
international  economic  scene. 
East-West  relations 
Trade  with  the  Eastern  bloc  accounts  for  a 
relatively  small  part  of  both  the  USA's  and  Europe's  overall 
economic  activity.  However,  the  figure  for  the  EEC  is markedly 
higher  than  that  for  the  USA.  (Currently  approximately  8%  of 
the  Community's  foreign  trade  is with  the East,  as  against  2% 
with  the  USA).  Exports  to  the  Eastern  bloc  countries  amount  to 
0 .15%  of  GNP  in  the  case  of  the  USA,  0. 76%  in  the  case  of 
France  and  1.15%  in  the  case  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  ( FRG) . 
These  figures  help  to  explain  the  deep  difference  of 
attitude  between  Europe  and  the  USA  regarding  trade  with 
Eastern bloc. -·- -------- ··-·--------------------·--···- ----------------·-·--- -··· 
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This  difference has  been  accentuated  by  the  American 
decision  to  use  economic  weapons  to get  the  USSR  to change  its 
attitude  in  the  East-West  confrontation. 
It  was  in  1980  (during  President  Carter's  term  of 
office)  that  an  embargo  was  imposed  on  sales of  technology  to 
the  USSR~  This  emb~rgo was  reinforced  in  Decemb~r 1981  (under 
President  Reagan).  During  this  period,  Europe  concluded  new 
contracts with  the  USSR,  the  r.atural  gas  contract  b':'!conting  in 
American  eyes  a  political  as well  as  an  economic  symbol.  This 
contract  covers  a  period  of  25  years  and  provides  for  the 
supply  of  40  thousand  million  m3  of  natural  gas  per  year  by 
the  USSR.  Europe  has  to provide  $  11  thousand million worth  of 
equipment.  This  equipment  will  be  paid  for  with  gas  over  a 
period of  10  years.  In  addition  the  USSR  is to  receive  $  8-9 
thousand  million  per  year  in  foreign  exchange, 
strengthen its balance  of trade. 
which  will 
Above  all,  the  USSR  has  secured  favourable _terms  for 
the  financing  of  this  equipment  by  dealing  separately  with 
each  of  the  countries concerned.  These  countries  were  not  able 
to  adopt  the  common  attitude  that  would  undoubtedly  have 
enabled  them  to negotiate  terms  more  favourable  to  themselves. 
(The  credit  interest  rates are,  for  example,  7.75%  in  the  case 
of France  and  FRG  and  cover  85%  of  the  purchases). 
However,  the  fact  that  the  embargo  on  grain supplies 
to  the  USSR  intrvduced  by  President  Carter  in  April  1980  was 
suspended  by  President  Reagan  in  April  1981  (for  purely 
domestic  reasons)  has  considerably  weakened  the  US  position 
vis-a-vis Europe. 
The  dispute  between  the  USA  and  Europe  has  been 
exacerbated  by  the  American  decision  of  18  June  1981  to extend 
the  technology  embargo  to  foreign  subsidiaries  (for  the  most 
part  in  Europe)  of  American  firms  and  to  equipment - 68  -
manufactured  under  American  licence.  A  large  number  of 
enterprises  and  jobs  in  the  EEC(l) could  be  seriously affected. 
The  Member  States  have  already  queried  what  they  consider  to 
be  the  extraterritorial  and  retrospective  appl:.c:'lt::.on 
(doubtless  contestable  in  law)  of  US  legislation. 
Even  if  the  American  decision  cen  be  regarded  as 
legally  justified  in  certain  cases  (:, ,,  view  c·f  the  terms  of 
the  contracts  concluded  between  American  companies  and  their 
licencees),  there  is  no  doubt  that it  intr~duces an  arbitrary 
and unsettling element  into  international  trade  relations.  The 
representatives of  the  American business  community  acknowledge 
this  themselves,  since  the  President  of  the  US  Chamber  of 
Commerce  recently  wrote  to  President  Reagan  informing  him  of 
his objections. 
Relations  with Japan 
Both  the  United  States  and  the  EEC  have  a  large 
trade  deficit with  Japan  (EEC  :  11.3  thousand  m:llion dollars; 
USA:  18.1  thousand  million  dollars).  In  many  se8tors,  the 
rate  of  penetration  of  Japanese  products  on  the  American 
market  is higher  than  in  Europe  23%  for  cars,  50%  for  radios 
and  25%  for  television  sets.  Advanced  technology  sectors 
(microprocessors,  etc.)  are  also  being  hard  hit  by  Japanese 
competition,  although  this  is  a  recent  phenomenon.  It seems 
that  thec'e  is  a  tendency  in  America  towards  protectionist 
measure2  against  Japan  in  these  sectors,  although  they  have  so 
far been  very  much  in  favour  of  free  trade.  Moreover  ; 
- the  volume  of  United  States/Japan  trade  is greater  than  that 
of  EEC/Japan  trade.  In  1981  American  exports  to  Japan  were 
worth  21.8  thousand  mill ion  dollars  (Community  exports  to 
(l)See  table  6  appended. - 69  -
Japan  :  6. 3  thousand  mill ion);  Japanese  exports  to  the  US 
were  worth  39.9  thousand  million  dollars  (Japanese  exports 
to  the  Community  :  17.6  thousand  million){!). 
- there  is  more  Japanese  industrial  investment  in  the  United 
States  than  in Europe  :  $  10  thousand million,  a  quarter of 
which  goes  towards  production  units,  as  opposed  to  $  4.  4 
thousand million in Europe,  850  million of which  is destined 
for production units  (Japanese  MITI  figures); 
- the  United  States wields  far  greater  bargaining  power  witn 
Japan  than  the  EEC,  both  for political  reasons  (defence)  and 
because  of  the  importance  of  the  American  market  for 
Japanese  industry (2). 
Japanese  trade  aggressiveness  is  nevertheless 
stirring  up  more  and  more  intense  reactions  in  the  United 
States.  In  this respect,  the  situation is very  similar to  that 
in  the  EEC. 
Nevertheless,  for  political  reasons  the  United 
States  continues,  c'.S  always,  to  refuse  to  pr-esent  a  common 
front  ("gang  up")  with  the  EEC  against  Japan.  The  EEC  thus 
faces  the  constant  risk  that  bilateral  United  States/Japan 
agreements  in  a  given  sector will  have  negative  repercussions 
in  Europe  (for  example  in  the  car  sector, 
mentioned). 
(l)Source  ·  US  Department  of  Commerce  and Eurostat. 
as  already 
( 2) See  the  Opinion  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  on 
Economic  and  Commercial  Relations  between  the  European 
Community  and  Japan.  (OJ  No.  C  230  of  10  September 1981). - 70  -
North-South  problems 
There  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  American 
and  European  views  on  this subject.  The  Reagan  Administration 
does  not  believe  that  public  aid  effectively  stimulates 
development  (e.g.  its  attitude  With  regard  uO  the  proposed 
World  Bank  energy  agency  and  the  Inter·national  Development 
Agency(l). It trtes to  deal  with  the  developing  countries  on  a 
bilateral  rather  than  a  multilateral  basis  (as  shown  by  its 
reticence  over  a  proposed  North-South  dialogue  in  the  economic 
field). 
On  the  other hand,  it declares  that it is in  favour 
of facilitating  access  of Third-World  products  to  the  American 
market  ("Trade  not  Aid").  It  is  a  fact  that  t:1e  American 
market  already  absorbs  a  larger share  of goods  manufactured  in 
developing  countries  than  the  European  market. 
In  its  moves  to  get  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
going  again,  the  United  States  Government  is  seeking  to 
introduce  a  clear  distinction  between  gen~ine  developing 
countries  and  those  which  have  alredy  attained  a  certain level 
of  industrialization.  For  the  latter,  tariff prefer·ences  would 
be  reduced,  and,  above  all,  these  countries  w011ld  be  asked  to 
offer  a  certain  measure  of  reciprocity  in  favour  of  American 
exports  (this  is  in  line  with  a  number  of  Opinions  issued  by 
the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  on  the  generalized  tariff 
preferences  scheme). 
(l) Set  up  to  lend  funds  to  developing  countries  at  low  rates 
of interest. - 71  -
Influence  of  the  USA  on  the  energy  situation in Europe 
The  USA  consumes  one  quarter of the world's oil. Its 
energy  policy  is  now  undergoing  a  profound  transformation, 
initiated by  P~esident Carter and  continued with modifications 
by President Reagan. 
This  transformation  could  be  favourable  to  Europe 
insofar as  the  increase  (through deregulation)  in the American 
oil  price  tends  to  reduce  consumption  and  stimulate 
exploration  and  production.  US  pressure  on  world  resources 
should  in  normal  circumstances  be  progressively  eased  as  a 
result. 
However,  the  principles  now  guiding  the  Reagan 
Administration's  energy  policy  are  radically  different  from 
those  that  gave  rise  to  the  Carter  programme.  Instead  of 
interventionist action to  reduce  demand,  increase  production 
and  develop  alternative  resources,  the  Reagan  Administration 
is  tending  to  rely  exclusively  on  market  forc-:es.  The  only 
action  to  restore  equilibrium  which  it  is  prepared  to 
countenance  is  price  deregulation, 
increase. 
which  means  a  price 
Because  it  places  faith  exclusively  in  the  market 
economy,  the  US  Administration  is  very  reticent  about  any 
collective  effort  to  control  the  energy  risk.  The  EEC  (with 
the  exception of  the  UK)  is thus  havir.g  increasingly  to  tackle 
by  itself  the  problems  posed  by  the  vulnerability of its oil 
supplies. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The  United States'  economic,  financial  and political 
power gives  it a  special  responsibility  in  its relations  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  and  consequently  the  EEC.  When  taking - 72  -
decisions,  the  leaders of the United States should assess  the 
possible  impact  on  other  countries.  Measures  which  directly 
affect  other  countries  should  be  subject  to  proper 
consultations  (as  suggested  by  the  concept  of  partnership 
launched  in  the  '60s  by  President Kennedy).  Anything  likely  to 
jeopardize  these  necessary consultations is to  be  avoided. 
From  the  beginning,  the  United  States  supported 
European  integt·ation  within  the  framework  of  the  EEC.  This 
attitude  has  been  reaffirmed  in  pol icy  statements  made  by 
Arr:et'ican  leaders- However,  it :i.s  increasingly contradicted in 
actual  economic  and  trade  policy decisions.  It is fair to ask 
whether  United  States  recognition  of  the  "European  edifice" 
(the  EEC,  its institutions  and  common  policies)  is  still  as 
strong  in American  Government  and  economic  circles. 
The  Community  institutions,  and  in  particular  the 
Commission,  have  stiffened  their  attitude  as  regards  the 
United  States.  This  demonstrates  the  EEC's  ability  to  react 
strongly  to  outside  pressures.  However,  the  Community  often 
finds  it difficult to  agree  on  a  valid commercial  strategy. 
American  trade  policy,  whilst  being wholly  defensive 
on  certain  points,  is  in  other respects  strongly aggressive, 
and  designed  to  promote  the  medium  and  long-term  interests of 
the  American  economy.  The  EEC  needs  a  decision-taking 
mechanism  which  would  allow it to  do  likewise. 
Even  though  the  United  States  have  taken  the 
initiative  to  get  the  cumbersome  GATT  negotiations  going 
again,  they  are  drawing  up  legislation  which,  if  adopted, 
would  jeopardize  GATT'S  fundamental  premise  - multilateralism. 
This  legislation  would  pave  the  way  for  greater  nationalism, 
allowing  the  USA  to  override  international  restraints  (as was - 73  -
the  case  during  the  monetary  crisis  in  the  early  seventies), 
and  to  wield  its  political  and  economic  superiority  more 
directly for  the benefit of its exporters. 
Current  difficulties  and  their  effect  on  public 
opinion have  made  it even  more  necessary  to  increase US/Europe 
consultations  at  all  levels,  including  the  political 
authorities and  socio-economic  interest groups,  with  a  view  to 
taking concerted action. 
The  Section  for  External  Relations  would  urge  the 
Committee  to produce,  at the earliest possible  date,  an  Own-
initiative  Opinion  between  the  European  Community  and  the 
United States. 
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*  *  *  *  :  A P  P  E  N D I  C E S  : 
*  *  *********************** 
The  Community's  External  Trade 
EC-US  Import-Export  Trade  - by  EC 
Member  State 
United States - Summary  of bilateral 
transactions with  the  European 
Community 
United States - Direct  investment 
abroad 
Foreign direct  investment  in  the  US 
US  Agricultural  Trade 
Companies  involved  in  the  Siberian 
gas  pipeline project 
The  importance  of  the  USA THE  COMMUNITY'S  EXTERNAL  TRADE  :  WORLD,  UNITED  STATES,  CANADA,  JAPAN,  AUSTRALIA,  NEW  ZEALAND,  E.F.T.A. 
Source  :  Eurostat,  Monthly  Trade  Bulletin,  Special  Number  1958-1980  & N°  4  - 1982  (million dollars) 
!  !  !  I  I  I  I  ! 
!  1974 
!  1975 
!  1976  !  1977 
!  1978 
!  1979 
!  1980  1981 
I  !  !  !  I  !  !  .  .  .  '  '  .  I 
Imports  (c.i.f.) 
World  (ex.  EC)  !  156  CJ08  !  155  660  I  178  174  !  197  608  !  227  165  !  298  968  378  082  !  339  000 
United  States  !  24  262  !  25  558  28  286  !  29  432  !  35  5~4  !  47  098  61  609  !  55  321 
Canada  !  4  778  !  4  380  4  873  !  4  914  !  5  056  !  6  982  8  505  !  7  400 
Japan  !  5  219  !  5  988  7  149  !  8  732  !  11  102  !  13  417  17  351  !  17  600 
Australia  !  1  979  !  1  991  2  520  !  2  396  !  2  409  !  3  244  3  441 
New  Zealand  !  1  022  !  841  935  !  1  030  !  1  240  !  1  464  1  518 
E.F.T.A.  I  24  403  !  25  119  27  817  !  31  995  !  41  847  !  56  036  68  059 
I  I  I  I  I 
--------------------·----------·---------- ----------:----------:----------:---------- ---------- ----------, I 
Exports  (f.  o. b.) 
-...J 
I  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
0> 
World  (ex.  EC)  136  235  !  150  400  !  157  748  !  189  884  !  221  617  !  266  032  !  312  491.3  !  294  500  I 
United States  18  977  !  16  380  !  18  149  !  23  429  !  29  432  !  34  321  !  36  989  !  41  137 
Canada  3  020  !  3  167  !  3  100  !  3  489  !  4  058  !  4  599  !  4  718  !  5  100 
Japan  3  303  !  2  763  !  3  040  !  3  524  I  4  748  !  6  346  I  6  362  !  6  300 
Australia  2  893  !  2  642  !  2  689  !  3  049  !  3  610  !  4  036  !  4  288  I 
New  Zealand  909  !  778  !  679  !  747  !  854  !  1  025  !  933 
E.F.T.A.  33  334  !  33  668  !  37  439  !  43  708  !  49  952  !  65  091  !  79  393 
!  !  !  !  I  !  I  ! 
~--------------------,----------,----------,----------,----------,-----------,----------,---------- ----------
:  Balance 
!  !  !  !  I  !  1 
!  !  !  I  ! 
World  (ex.  EC)  !  - 19  773  !  - 5  260  !  - 20  425  I  - 7  724  !  - !:i  548  I  - 32  936  !  - 65  587  !  - 44  500 
United States  !  - 5  285  I  - 9  179  !  - 10  137  I  - 6  003  !  - 6  122  !  - 12  777  !  - 24  625  !  - 14  184 
Canada  !  -·  1  7!:8  !  - 1  213  !  - 1  773  !  - 1  425  !  - 998  !  - 2  383  !  - 3  786  !  - 2  300  '~ 
Japan  I  - 3  109  !  - 3  225  !  - 4  109  !  - 5  208  !  - 6  354  I  - 7  071  !  - 10  989  !  - 11  300  !  ~ 
Australia  I  915  !  651  I  169  !  653  !  1  201  !  792  !  846  !  I  1-' 
New  Zealand  l  - 32  !  - 63  !  - 256  !  - 283  !  - 386  !  - 439  I  585  !  !  ~ 
E.F.T.A.  I  8  931  !  8  549  !  9  622  !  11  713  !  8  105  !  9  055  !  11  334  I  I,_. 
I ....... 
EC-US  IMPORT-EXPORT  TRADE  :  BY  EC  MEMBER  STATE 
Source  ;  Eurostat,  Monthl~ Trade  Bulletin,  SEecial  Number  1958-1980  & n°  4  - 1982  (million dollars) 
!  I  I  I  I  I  I 
!  1974  !  1975  !  1976  !  1977  !  1978  !  1979  1980  !  1981 
!  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
ImEorts  from  USA  (c.i.f.)  !  !  ! 
I  I  I 
Germany  I  5  396  I  5  788  i  6  971  I  6  922  I  8  197  I  ·10  431  13  509  I  12  064 
France  I  4  102  I  4  082 
!  4  721  I  4  894  I  5  968  I  8  094  10  761  I  8  794 
Italy  !  3  132  I  3  361  !  3  430  I  3  283  I  3  817  I  5  278  6  679  I  6  195 
Net  he rlan  ds  I  2  959 
I  3  474 
I  3  627 
I  3  890  I  4  555  I  5  661  6  747  I  6  264 
Belgium/Luxembourg  !  1  941  I  1  954 
!  2  166  I  2  428  I  2  794  I  3  988  5  494  I  4  456 
United  Kingdom  I  5  886 
I  5  997 
I  6  374  I  6  662  I  8  877  I  11  962  15  918  I  14  1183 
Ireland  !  247  I  272  !  358  I  381  !  534  !  722  874 
!  1  086 
Denmark  !  601  !  630  !  637  !  760  !  812  !  961  1  273  !  1  520 
(Greece)  457 
EC  Total 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
24  262  ;  25  558  ;  28  286  ;  29  220  ;  35  554  ;  47  098  ;  61  256  ;  55  321  ; 
---------------------------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------~---------
Exports  to  USA  (f.o.b.)  ! I 
-..,J 
Germany  1  6  696  1  5  349  1  5  722  I  7  842  1  10  013  I  11  332  I  11  651  I  11  565  -...J 
France  j  2  241  j  2  044  j  2  527  j  3  266  ;  4  273  j  4  792  j  4  933  j  5  605  1 
Italy  j  2  311  ;  2  283  j  2  403  ;  3  002  j  3  990  j  4  662  j  3  822  j  5  155 
Netherlands  j  1  307  j  965  ;  1  139  ;  1  497  ;  1  657  ;  1  785  ;  1  859  ;  2  238 
Belgium/Luxembourg  j  1  584  j  1  174  ;  1  164  ;  1  571  ;  1  849  ;  2  104  j  2  183  ;  2  329 
United  Kingdom  ;  4  132  j  3  911  j  4  431  j  5  386  j  6  626  ;  8  584  j  10  820  j  12  502 
Ireland  ;  256  ;  195  j  231  j  273  j  350  j  350  ;  446  j  490 
Denmark  j  451  j  459  j  531  j  582  j  674  j  712  ;  787  j  878 
(Greece)  ;  ;  ;  ;  1  ;  ;  j  375 
----------------------------;---------;---------;---------;---------;---------;---------;---------;---------
EC  Total  j  18  977  i  16  380  j  18  149  j  23  419  i  29  432  i  34  321  i  36  499  l  41  137 
Balance 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
United  Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
(Greece) 
1  300 
1  861 
821 
1  652 
357 
1  754 
9 
150 
439 
2  038 
1  078 
2  509 
780 
2  086 
77 
171 
1  249 
2  194 
1  027 
2  488 
1  002 
1  943 
127 
106 
920  ! 
1  628  : 
281. 
2  393  : 
857 
1  276  : 
108  I 
178  I 
1  816 
1  695 
173 
2  898 
945 
2  251 
184 
138 
901 
3  302 
616 
3.  876 
1  884 
3  378 
372 
249 
I  !  I 
1  858 
5  828 
2  857 
4  888 
3  311 
5  099 
429 
486 
499 
3  189 
1  040 
4  026 
2  127 
1  981 
596 
642 
82  ~ 
----------------------------~---------~---------~---------~---------,---------,---------~---------,---------, 
EC  Total  :  - 5  285  .  - 9  179  :  -10  137  :  - 5  801  j  - 6 ~  -12  776  j  -24  758  j  -14  184  j -.... 
UNITED  STATES 
1975-1981 
SUMMARY  OF  BILATERAL  TRANSACTIONS  WITH  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
§g~r£~ :  u.s.  Department  of Commerce,  survey  o~ Current  Business 
$  milliard 
1975  !  1976  !  1977  !  1978  !  1979  I  1980  !  1981 
!  !  !  !  !  I  !  ! 
~-----------------------------------,--------,--------,--------,--------,--------,-------- --------
I  !  !  !  !  ! 
Merchandise  Trade  !  !  !  !  I 
(excl.  Military)  !  I  !  !  I 
I  I  !  I  I 
Exports  !  22.9  !  24.9  !  26.5  !  31.9  !  42.4  !  53.5  !  51.5 
I  I  I  !  !  I  !  Imports  !  - 16.5  !  - 17.7  !  - 22.1  !  - 29.0  !  - 33.2  - 36.1  - 41.4 
!  !  !  !  ! 
Balance  !  +  6.3  !  +  7.2  I  +  4.4  !  +  2.9  !  +  9.2  I  +  17.4  !  +  10.1 
!  !  !  !  I  !  ! 
Service~ 
!  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Exports  9.3  10.8  12.4  !  16.8  i  26.7  29.5  29.5 
!  I  !  !  ! 
Imports  !  - 10.2  !  - 10.9  !  - 12.0  I  - 16.1  !  - 21.9  !  - 26.0  !  - 29.4 
!  I  !  I  ! 
Balance 
I  0.9 
!  0.1  !  0.4 
I  0.7 
!  4.8  3.5  0.1  - - +  +  +  +  + 
Goods  and  services 
'  '  '  ' 
I  I  I 
Exports  I  32.1  !  35.7  !  38.9  !  48.7  !  69.1  !  83.0  !  80.9 
!  I  !  !  I  I  !  Imports  I  - 26.7  !  - 28.6  !  - 34.1  - 45.1  - 55.1  - 62.1  - 70.8 
!  !  ! 
Balance  !  +  5.4  !  +  7.1  !  +  4.8  !  +  3.6  I  +  13.9  !  +  20.9  !  +  1C .1 
!  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Unilateral  transferts  !  0.1  !  o.o  !  0.1  !  0.1  I  0.3  !  0.6  !  0.4 
I  I  I  I  I  I  !  Balance  on  militarl transactions  !  - 1.7  !  - 1.7  I  - 2.1  I  - 2.7  I  - 2.9  !  - 2.7  !  - 3.7 
1  Balance  on  current account  I  3.8  I  5.4  !  2.9  !  1.1  !  11.4  I  18.7  I  6.7 
I  ..., 
co 
! 
I! 
! 
I 
! 
! ...... 
UNITED  STATES  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  ABROAD  - Net  Investment  Position at  Year  End  (Billion  $) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
!  i  1966  ! 1970  ;  1973  ! 1974  i  1975  ! 1976  ! 1977  ;  1978  !  1979  i  1980 
,----------------------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------,-------
!  !  '  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
World  54.8  !  78.2  !  101.3  !  110.2  !  124.2  !  136.4  !  149.8  !  168.1  !  186.8  !  213.5 
!  !  ! 
EC  13.6  !  20.3  !  30.9  !  35.4  !  39.1  !  43.2  !  47.9  !  55.2  !  65.7  !  76.6 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  --
Belgium/Lux.  !  !  2.5!  2.9!  3.3!  3.6  4.3!  4.7!  6.4!  6.9 
'  '  '  '  '  '  '  '  France  !  !  4. 3  1  4. 9  !  5. 8  !  5. 9  6. 1  j  6. 8  1  8. 0  1  9. 4 
Germany  !  !  7.7!  8.0!  8.8!  10.5  11.1!  12.7!  13.6!  15.4 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Italy  !  !  2.2!  2.7;  2.6!  2.9  3.0!  3.6!  4.4!  5.4 
Nertherlands  !  !  !  2.4!  3.3!  3.4!  3.5  4.0!  4.7!  6.9!  7.9 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
United  Kingdom  j  1  1  11.0!  12.5!  13.9!  15.1  17.4  1  20.3  1  23.6  1  28.1 
Denmark  !  !  !  0. 5  !  0. 7  !  0. 6  !  0. 7  !  0.  7  !  1.  6  !  1 .1  !  1. 3 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Irelanrl  ·  0.3  0.5  ·  0.6  ·  0.9  1.1  0.9  1.8  2.3  -.J 
\!) 
'  UNITED  STATES  :  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  IN  THE  U.S.  - Net  Investment  Position at Year  End  (Billion  $) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  ;  1950  ;  1960  ;  1970  ;  1974  ;  1975  ;  1976  ;  1977  ;  1978  ;  1979  ;  1980 
j----------------------j-------;-------;-------;---~---;-------;-------;-------;-------;-------;-------1 
!  World  !  3.4  !  6.9  !  13.3  !  25.1  !  27.7  !  30.8  !  34,6  !  40.8  !  54.5  !  65.5 
!  -- ! 
!  EC  !  1.7  !  3.4  !  7.4  !  14.1  I  15.6  !  17.0  !  20.1  !  23.9  !  32.3  !  37.9 
- ! 
Belgium/lux.  !  !  !  !  0.7  !  0.8  !  0.8  !  1.2  !  1.3  !  1.6  !  •1.9 
l  !  !  '  !  !  I  !  I  I 
France 
'  '  ' 
!  1.1  ' 
1.4 
' 
1.6  I  1.8  !  1.9  !  2.3  !  2.7  .~  .  Ill 
Germany  !  I  0.1  !  0. 7  !  1.5  !  1.4  !  2.1  !  2.5  '  3.2  !  5.7  !  5.3  !0" 
'  '  ' 
I  !  !  I  '  '  I  .... 
Italy  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  !  ct 
I  !  !  !  ' 
!  !  !  '  !  '  •.t. 
Netherlands  I  0.3  !  0.9  !  2. 1  !  4.7  !  5.3  !  6.3  !  7.8  !  9.8  !  12.7  !  16.2 
'  '  '  !  !  !  ' 
I  I  I 
United  Kingdom  ' 
1.2 
' 
2.2  ! 
4.1 
' 
5.7  !  6.3  !  5.8  !  6.4  !  7.4  !  9.8  !  11.4  . 
Denmark/Ireland  ' 
!  !  !  0.1  ' 
0.1  !  0.1  !  0.1  I  0.1  ' 
0.2  !  0.2 
I  I  I  I  I 
Source  ;  United  States Department  of  Commerce,  Survey  of Current  Business U.S.  AGRICULTURAL  fRAD£  1975-1981 
Source  ------
:  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture 
( $  mill ion) 
!  !  !  !  !  ! 
1975  !  1976  !  1977  !  1978  !  1979  !  1980  !  1981 
!  !  !  !  !  ---------------------,----------,----------,----------,----------,----------,----------,----------, 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
Exports  to 
!  !  I 
World  !  21.859  !  22.978 
!  23.636  !  29.382  !  34.749  !  41.233  !  43.337 
EC  - 10  !  5.987  !  6.727  !  6.887  !  7.462  !  8.134  !  9.236  !  9.059 
!  !  I  !  I  i  I 
Canada  !  1.310  !  1.490  !  1.540  !  1.643  !  1.6S1  !  1.852  !  1.989 
Japan  !  3.102  !  3.595  !  3.893  !  4.484  !  5.287  !  6.111  !  6.562 
Imports  (*) 
!  I  I  !  !  I  I  I  Q:l 
World  9.293  10.966  13.438  14.805  16.724  17.366  16.778  0 
!  !  !  !  !  !  ! 
EC  - 10  !  1.678  !  1.979  !  2.091  !  2.763  !  1.950  !  2.130  !  2.263 
I  I  I  !  I  I  I 
Canada  !  499  !  613  !  689 
!  778 
!  961 
!  1.061  !  1.150 
Japan  !  64  !  76  !  79  !  102  !  89  !  99  !  120 
Suq21us  with 
I  I  !  I  I 
18.025  .  .  World  !  12.566  !  12.012  !  10.198  !  14.577 
!  !  23.867 
!  26.559 
EC  - 10  !  4.309  !  4.748  !  4.796  !  4.699  !  6.184  !  7.106  I  6.796  !  o-3 
I  I  I  I  I  i  I  I  Ill 
Canada  811  877  851  865  730  791  839  0' 
!  !  !  !  I  !  !  ! 
1-' 
CD 
Japan  !  3.038  !  3.519  !  3.814  !  4.382  !  5.198  I  6.012  !  6.442  ! 
(11 
(*)  Customs  Value  Basis  (=  FOB) - 81  -
RELATIONS  WITH  THE  USSR 
companies  involved  in  the  Siberian gas  pipeline project 
FRANCE  - 4.5  thousand  mi 11 ion 
:francs 
Althorn-Atlantique  ............  40  rotors  400 million  French  francs 
Creusot-Loire ...............  22  compression  stations  1.5  thousand million  French francs 
Thomson-CSF  .................  Telecommunications  and  1.8  thousand million  French :francs 
teleprocessing systems 
Merl in-Ge rin  +  C.E.M.  .......  Electrical equipment  150 million  Fr-ench  francs,  o:f  which 
40 million for C.E.M. 
WEST  GERMANY 
A.E.G.-Kanis ................  47  turbines  OM  700 million 
Mannesmann  ...................  1,200,000 tonnes  of large- OM  430 million 
diameter pipes,  compression 
stations (in conjunction 
with  the  French  company 
Vallourec) 
ITALY 
Nuevo  Pignone  .. ··········· ..  19  compression stations  +  5  thousand million dollars 
57  turbines.  Other equipment  100 million dollars 
GREAT  BRITAIN  - £200  million 
Ruston  Gas  ..................  Turbines  £30 million 
John  Brown  ..................  21  turbines  £104  million 
JAPAN 
Kometsu  .....................  885  pipelaying machines  in  The  contr~ct figures  are  not  avail-
two  deliveries,  the first of  able at present.  But it should  be 
350  and  the  second  of 495  noted  that last february  the  USSR 
machines.  asked  the  Japan<-'Se  banks  for  a  loan 
Nippon  Steel,  Kawasaki  Steel,  78,500,000  tonnes  of large- of  70  million  Jc llars to  finance 
Sumimoto  Metal  Industries,  diameter pipes  the  pipeline.  ln addition,  in 
Nippon  Kohan  ................  November  1981  the  Export-Import 
Bank  lOa."l.,d  the  'JSSR  80  thousand 
million yen  towards  the  cost of  im-
po:-ting  700,000  tonnes  o:f  pipes. 
~- :  These  figures  do  not  reveal  the  full  scope  of this project  as  small  companies  are  also 
involved. 
"Le  Nouveau  Journal",  24  July  1982 - 82  -
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  USA 
There  has been  a  relative decline in the econorruc 
importance of the  USA  over the past 20  years 
GNP  as  a  percentage of the  GNP  of the  USA 
(at current prices and  exchange  rates) 
European  Community 
Table  7 European  Communities  - Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Relations  between  the  European  Community  and  the  United  States 
Own-initiative  Opinion  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
Brussels  :  General  Secretariat of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee 
1983  - 82  pages 
Dk,  D,  E,  F,  I,  N,  Gr. 
An  Information Report  on  EEC/US  Relations,  compiled 
by  the  Section  for  External  Relations,  was  presented  to  the 
Committee  at  the  Plenary  Session held  on  27  October  1982. 
In  following  up  this work  with  an  Optnion,  the  Com-
mittee  has  concentrated  on  the  ties uniting  the  two  partners, 
which  far  outweigh  the  existing areas  of  discord.  After scru-
tiny  of  the  points that  the  USA  and  the  Commu~ity have  in  com-
mon  and,  of their disputes, the Opinion  looks  at  the  sectors 
where  disputes  arise  (R  & D,  cars,  petrochemicals,  synthetic 
fibres,  textiles,  footwear,  services,  sea/ai:'  transport,  steel). 
It regrets  the  recent  US  unilateral  decision,  limiting special 
steel  imports  from  the  EEC. 
The  Committee  recommends  solutions  aimed  at creating, 
with  the  help  of economic  and  social  groups  on  both  sides of 
the  Atlantic,  the  climate  of close  cooperation  required by  the 
partners'  extensive  trade  relationship  and  major world  econo-
mic  role. 